In the 1940s and early 1950s, the Cold War convention of containment, which undergirded American involvement in Vietnam, was broadly shared, internalized, at times even fostered, by the United States European allies. This consensus broke down by the 1960s, as successive US administrations saw themselves locked ever more rigidly into Cold War logic which seemed to require going to war to preserve a noncommunist South Vietnam. By contrast, the United States transatlantic allies and partners increasingly came to question the very rationale of US intervention. By the mid-1960s there was a remarkable consensus among government officials across Western Europe on the futility of the central objective of the American intervention in Vietnam of defending and stabilizing a noncommunist (South) Vietnam. European governments refused to send troops to Vietnam. However, West European governments differed considerably in the public attitude they displayed toward US involvement in Vietnam, ranging from France’s vocal opposition to strong if not limitless public support by the British and West German governments. Across Western Europe, the Vietnam War cut deeply into West European domestic politics, aggravated political and societal tensions and diminished the righteousness of the American cause.

RAR created a particular military culture in which its troops developed powerful bonds of soldiery loyalty to their regiment. This loyalty was created through the Rhodesian Army mimicking the invented traditions of British colonial regiments, which were historically successful in creating in-group solidarity among troops. In contrast to much received opinion, recruitment to the RAR was not dependent upon either ethno-regional or familial identity, and soldiers from all over the country joined the army for myriad reasons. Masvingo catchment area became important, although not dominant, in supplying recruits. Likewise, soldiering became a metier prevalent within certain families. By the onset of the war for Zimbabwe, the RAR’s soldierly potency had been greatly enhanced by operational experience. structure and ethos of the RAR underwent significant changes at the tail end of the Federation and after the Rhodesian Front’s rise to power. In particular, a new emphasis upon the counter-insurgency doctrine learned during the Malayan Emergency indicated a shift towards being deployed on COIN tasks within Rhodesia.

An Epilogue traces the main legacies for Southeast Asia of its wartime occupation. For most of the region, occupation resulted in revolution or civil war and often a fundamental societal shift, opening the way for post-war social and political transformations. Recovery to pre-war levels of per capita GDP was slow for several countries. Only by the 1990s did the long-term trajectory of an outward-looking, export-oriented Southeast Asia reassert itself.