We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Donald J. Trump’s election portended fundamental changes in America’s relations with its major trading partners and allies. However, Japan’s prime minister, Abe Shinzō, in developing a relationship with Trump as well as an understanding of how to deal with him, positioned Japan as a reliable partner of the US in its assertive stance against China and North Korea. Abe also understood the importance to Trump of image and perception and used this to Japan’s advantage throughout Trump’s term, particularly in his careful use of flattery and in Japan’s agreement to accept largely symbolic trade concessions. The Trump administration’s “America First” approach and its consequent abandonment of America’s leadership role in the region left a vacuum that Japan filled, notably in the resurrection of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Japan’s concept of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” found support in Washington. However, Tokyo’s calibrated approach to China, which blended competition and cooperation, was not adopted by the US, which prioritized competition.
Korea’s public diplomacy vis-à-vis the US is the centerpiece of the country’s overall public diplomacy policy, with an emphasis on influencing the policy elites in Washington, DC, primarily through think tank-centric activities. This chapter explores Korea’s public diplomacy strategy vis-à-vis the US with an emphasis on the “policy public diplomacy” that was introduced in 2016 – coinciding mostly with the presidencies of Moon Jae-in in Seoul and Donald Trump in Washington, DC. At the policy elite level, the main objective of Korean public diplomacy in the US has been to generate support for Korea’s foreign policies, including in inter-Korean relations; and at the grassroots level, creating more favorability among the general American public. The former is more based on agenda-setting and framing Korean Peninsula-related issues and Korea’s increasing role in global governance. The latter is more diffuse and attempts to increase the country’s visibility and improve its brand value. In this time period, Korean public diplomacy has become partisan for the first time due to dividing nature of emphasis on inter-Korean relations in policy public diplomacy in the US.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.