This essay inquires whether digitally transformed work can be virtuous and under what conditions. It eschews technological determinism in both utopian and dystopian versions, opting for the premise of free human agency. This work is distinctive in adopting an actor-centric and explicitly ethical analysis based on neo-Aristotelian, Catholic social teaching (CST), and MacIntyrean teachings on the virtues. Beginning with an analysis of digital disruption, it identifies the most salient human advantages vis-à-vis technology in digitally transformed work and provides philosophical anthropological explanations for each. It also looks into external, organizational characteristics on both the macro and the micro levels of digitally transformed work, underscoring their ambivalence (efficiency and profits vs. exclusion and exploitation, flexibility and freedom vs. standardization and dependency) and the need to mitigate their polarizing effects for the sake of shared flourishing. The article presents standards for virtuous work according to neo-Aristotelian, CST, and MacIntyrean frames and applies them to digitally transformed work, giving rise to five fundamental principles. These basic guidelines indicate, on one hand, actions to be avoided and, on the other, actions to be pursued, together with their rationales.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century the Athenian philosopher Theophilos Korydalleus launched a political programme intended to reinvigorate Hellenic culture and education in South-Eastern Europe as a core element of Greek Orthodox identity. Korydalleus’ ideas on political intervention in the educational affairs of the Orthodox Greeks are recorded in one of his public speeches as well as in his private letters. In these texts it is possible to trace the emergence of a group of loyalists and disciples, who worked together in a political movement: a ‘party of friends’. This article presents and discusses sources which have been overlooked or have received little scholarly attention. It identifies the characteristics and the ideological underpinnings of this movement from a political, religious, and educational perspective and analyses Korydalleus’ views on contemporary political developments.

This case-study concerns Greek Aristotelianism in the seventeenth century. More specifically, my article deals with the impact of neo-Aristotelianism upon the formation of the philosophical curriculum of the Greek-speaking world during that period. I examine aspects of the – rather understudied – influence exerted by Cesare Cremonini on Theophilos Korydalleus. The terms ‘authentic interpreters’/‘authentic interpretation’ and ‘νεώτεροι’ in Theophilos’ works of natural philosophy not only highlight the influence of Cremonini, but also hint at critical views held by the former, as well as terminology which is either absent or has a different meaning in treatises of the latter.

Many neo-Aristotelians argue that practical identities are normative, that is, they provide us with reasons for action and create binding obligations. Kantian constructivists agree with this insight but argue that contemporary Aristotelians fail to fully justify it. Practical identities are normative, Kantian constructivists contend, but their normativity necessarily derives from the normativity of humanity. In this paper, I shed light on this underexplored similarity between neo-Aristotelian and Kantian constructivist accounts of the normativity of practical identities, and argue that both ultimately fail. I end by suggesting an alternative justification of the claim that practical identities are normative.

Recent defenders of Philippa Foot, such as Michael Thompson and John Hacker-Wright, have argued that it is a mistake to think that Foot aims to justify a substantive conception of human soundness and defect. Instead, she relies on the acceptance of certain groundless moral norms to underwrite her views about what is characteristically human. I maintain that this is a weakness and that the Footian-style proponent of natural normativity needs to provide a story about how we might achieve justified self-confidence regarding moral norms. In this paper, I offer a coherentist model for doing so, thereby addressing the justification gap.