The discussion about the moral status of novel beings tends to focus on artificial intelligence, robots, and other man-made systems. We should, however, also consider a likelier kind of novel beings: animals that are genetically modified to develop human-like cognitive capabilities. This paper focuses on the possibility of conferring human characteristics on nonhuman primates (NHPs) in the context of neuroscientific research. It first discusses the use of NHPs for neuroscientific research and then, second, describes recent developments that promise to revolutionize the field and how that may lead to NHPs attaining human-like cognitive capabilities. Third, an account of moral status is developed to ground the central claim, that making the NHP brain more human-like is unproblematic as long as the NHPs do not become persons. In conclusion, this paper discusses the implications for the moral status of cognitively enhanced NHPs, as well as the implications for other novel beings.

The relationship between zoo animals, particularly nonhuman primates, and visitors is complex and varies by species. Adding complexity to this relationship is the trend for zoos to host events outside of normal operating hours. Here, we explored whether a late-night haunted-house style event influenced the behavior of spider monkeys. We conducted behavioral observations both on event nights and nights without the event. The spider monkeys were active and outside more frequently on event nights compared to the control nights indicating that their typical nighttime behavior was altered. However, it is difficult to definitively conclude whether the behavioral changes were a result of the event being aversive or enriching. Our findings suggest that zoos should conduct behavioral observations of and collect physiological data from their animals, especially if they are sensitive to environmental changes, when implementing new events, including those occurring outside of normal operating hours to ensure high levels of animal welfare.

In primates and carnivores, the main laminae of the dorsal lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) receive monocular excitatory input in an eye-alternating fashion. There is also evidence that nondominant eye stimulation can reduce responses to dominant eye stimulation and that a subset of LGN cells in the koniocellular (K) layers receives convergent binocular excitatory input from both eyes. What is not known is how the two eye inputs summate in the K layers of LGN. Here, we aimed to answer this question by making extracellular array electrode recordings targeted to K layers in the marmoset (Callithrix jacchus) LGN, as visual stimuli (flashed 200 ms temporal square-wave pulses or drifting gratings) were presented to each eye independently or to both eyes simultaneously. We found that when the flashed stimulus was presented to both eyes, compared to the dominant eye, the peak firing rate of most cells (61%, 14/23) was reduced. The remainder showed response facilitation (17%) or partial summation (22%). A greater degree of facilitation was seen when the total number of spikes across the stimulus time window (200 ms) rather than peak firing rates was measured. A similar pattern of results was seen for contrast-varying gratings and for small numbers of parvocellular (n = 12) and magnocellular (n = 3) cells recorded. Our findings show that binocular summation in the marmoset LGN is weak and predominantly sublinear in nature.

The presence of general intelligence poses a major evolutionary puzzle, which has led to increased interest in its presence in nonhuman animals. The aim of this review is to critically evaluate this question and to explore the implications for current theories about the evolution of cognition. We first review domain-general and domain-specific accounts of human cognition in order to situate attempts to identify general intelligence in nonhuman animals. Recent studies are consistent with the presence of general intelligence in mammals (rodents and primates). However, the interpretation of a psychometric g factor as general intelligence needs to be validated, in particular in primates, and we propose a range of such tests. We then evaluate the implications of general intelligence in nonhuman animals for current theories about its evolution and find support for the cultural intelligence approach, which stresses the critical importance of social inputs during the ontogenetic construction of survival-relevant skills. The presence of general intelligence in nonhumans implies that modular abilities can arise in two ways, primarily through automatic development with fixed content and secondarily through learning and automatization with more variable content. The currently best-supported model, for humans and nonhuman vertebrates alike, thus construes the mind as a mix of skills based on primary and secondary modules. The relative importance of these two components is expected to vary widely among species, and we formulate tests to quantify their strength.