Chapter 5 commences by retracing how, beginning in Nuremberg, the reasonable person entered the battlefield in the form of the reasonable military commander. Subsequently the chapter explores two challenges that confront the concept of the reasonable person on the battlefield and beyond. The first challenge consists in the fact that it is easier to empathise with people who are close to us. In the theatre of war, this raises the question whether the reasonable person, when acting as the reasonable military commander, can meaningfully balance the interests of civilians on opposite sides. The second challenge relates to the fact that it is more difficult for powerful people such as military commanders (or judges) to take the perspective of others and to empathise with them.

This chapter outlines the evolution of BHR since the 1990s in three stages: the beginnings, the growth phase, and, finally, the time of consolidation. Before doing so, it touches on three significant precursors, which are often overlooked in more cursory historical accounts of the BHR movement. Those are the Nuremburg Trials, the activities of Western companies in apartheid South Africa, and the opposition of the local Ogoni population against oil extraction in Nigeria's Niger Delta. Furthermore, it outlines a number of BHR initiatives such as the UN Global Compact, the UN Draft Norms and the mandate of the UN Special Representative on BHR and its main product, the UN Guiding Principles on BHR (UNGPs).The chapter describes the evolution of BHR both as a movement and as an academic field.

It is generally accepted that bodies corporate are, at the least, partial subjects of international law and enjoy a measure of international legal personality when they are party to an armed conflict, as that notion is understood by international humanitarian law. It is further unquestioned that the members of a private corporation may be held individually responsible under international criminal law for international crimes they have committed in the course of their work. This was made clear in judgments in the Nuremberg Military Tribunals that followed the end of the Second World War. Bodies corporate are also bound by jus cogens human rights norms, including the prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of life and on enforced disappearance.

The Nuremberg trials stand as a pivotal moment in any history of international law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law and international human rights.1 As Teitel writes, ‘the trials at Nuremberg represented a unique historical crossroads for the three legal orders that form the humanity law framework’.2 By introducing crimes against humanity into international law, the trials are said to have contributed to the creation of a new normative order, aimed at protecting vulnerable humanity.3 For prosecuting individuals for these and other war crimes, they are presented as an example of the rationality and calm procedure of international law overcoming violence, power and the baser instincts of revenge.4

Professor Aron Trainin (1883–1957), an outstanding Russian and Soviet criminal law scholar, has played a leading role in academic support of the Soviet Union’s team in Nuremberg and contributed to the drafting of the IMT Charter and Judgment. His writings to a large extent shaped the Soviet approach to international criminal law. The chapter addresses Trainin’s biography and follows the major steps in his academic career from its beginning in tsarist Russia to its the peak, when Trainin held the positions of associate member of Soviet Academy of Sciences and professor at Moscow University. The chapter traces the sources of Trainin’s interest in international criminal law and addresses the scholar’s contribution to the ICL. The author focuses specifically on two areas, where the impact of Trainin’s was significant – a legal justification for crimes against peace, and the concept of complicity.

This chapter outlines Allied efforts at justice for Nazi crimes. It describes how the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg prioritized the prosecution of aggressive war and rendered Nazi atrocities secondary. The chapter then analyzes how subsequent American trials at Nuremberg did focus on Nazi atrocities, but how the defense attorneys successfully shaped the German public perception of the trials, so that they largely failed in their liberalizing pedagogy. The chapter also evaluates the national trial programs conducted by the Americans, British, French, and Soviets for “ordinary” German war crimes. It argues that these trials received only modest public attention, in comparison to the Nuremberg trials, and that, because these trials were focused overwhelmingly on crimes against Allied nationals, they had very limited impact on German political culture. Overall, the chapter concludes that the Allied trials did not have the kind of democratizing impact suggested by transitional justice theory.

Used wisely, inside and outside the courtroom, strategic litigation may be an important vehicle for achieving accountability. To show how communities and advocates sparked the life of a movement seeking accountability of corporate actors under international law, this chapter will provide a chronological account of developments and setbacks that the movement has faced. Using Chiquita as a case study, the chapter distils the recent history of corporate accountability under international law. It follows a linear approach, explaining the developments and set-backs in corporate criminal responsibility under international law. It starts with Nuremberg as a milestone, and goes on to analyze subsequent approaches supporting or rejecting the accountability of corporate officers and corporations. Passing through domestic litigation that emanated from Nuremberg precedents, as well as the subsequent developments, the chapter tells the recent history of corporate accountability under international criminal law.

When the protracted Syrian conflict eventually comes to an end and transitional justice in its many manifestations is properly operationalized, a test case for the prosecution of economic actors under international criminal law may emerge. The evidence of international crimes in Syria has been documented and subjected to scrutiny and analysis since the start of the conflict in 2011, by the United Nations, non-governmental organizations, and domestic investigative bodies. This chapter examines investigative approaches towards uncovering the role of economic actors alleged to have facilitated international crimes attributed to the Syrian regime. The work of the Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA) and the limitations of the CIJA model in investigating international crimes of an economic nature are first explained before outlining the applicable jurisprudential framework with reference to customary international law. The chapter proceeds to examine how economic actors who are engaged in activities in Syria during the conflict might be held to account in law where they are suspected of the perpetration of core international crimes.