It was investigated whether concealing learned stimulus attributes (i.e., trustworthiness vs. untrustworthiness) has similar effects on the P3 amplitude than concealing stimulus familiarity. According to salience hypothesis, known, deceptive stimuli (probe) are (perceived) more relevant than truthful, unknown stimuli (irrelevant) evoking a more positive probe P3 amplitude. When all stimuli are known, concealing information is more cognitively demanding than non-concealing information evoking a less positive P3 amplitude according to the mental effort account. Ninety-seven participants concealed knowledge of previously learned faces in the familiarity condition (probe vs. irrelevant stimuli). In the trustworthiness condition, participants concealed untrustworthiness to previously learned faces and responded truthfully to previously learned trustworthy and untrustworthy faces (known, concealed vs. known, truthful stimuli). The parietal mean P3 amplitude was more positive for probe stimuli than for irrelevant stimuli in the familiarity condition providing evidence for the salience hypothesis. In the trustworthiness condition, concealing untrustworthiness showed the smallest parietal mean P3 amplitude suggesting evidence for the mental effort hypothesis. Individual differences of perpetrator’s sensitivity to injustice modulated the P3 amplitude in the trustworthiness condition.