This paper obtains an optimal strategy in a finite horizon time for a portfolio of a defined contribution (DC) pension fund for an investor with the CRRA utility function. It employs the optimal stochastic control method in a financial market with two different asset markets, one risk-free and another one risky asset in which its jump follows either by a finite or infinite activity Lévy process. Sensitivity of jump parameters in an uncertainty financial market has been studied.

The papers in this volume examine a series of important questions that influence the transition from full time employment to complete retirement. Retirement is shown to be a process as individuals move from career jobs to bridge jobs to being out of the labor force. The articles examine the characteristics of bridge jobs and the employment conditions that older workers prefer. Analysis provided by the authors show the importance of saving throughout work life and how pension plans and retirement saving plans influence the timing of retirement.

Over the past two decades, the share of individuals claiming Social Security at the Early Eligibility Age has dropped and the average retirement age has increased. At the same time, Social Security rules have changed substantially, employer-sponsored retirement plans have shifted from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC), health has improved, and mortality has decreased. In theory, all of these changes could lead to a trend toward later claiming. Disentangling the effect of any one change is difficult because they have been occurring simultaneously. This paper uses the Gustman and Steinmeier structural model of retirement timing to investigate which of these changes matter most by simulating their effects on the original cohort (1931–1941) of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The predicted behavior is then compared with the actual retirements of the Early Boomer cohort (1948–1953) to see how much of the later cohort's delayed claiming and retirement can be explained by these changes. The Early Boomer cohort was less likely to be fully retired than the HRS cohort at both age 62 (36.7% vs. 44.0%) and age 64 (49.5% vs. 53.9%). The model suggests that the shift from DB toward DC plans was the biggest contributor to these declines, followed by better health. Social Security rules and improvements in mortality played smaller roles.

Some public sectors provide cash-balance pension plans with guaranteed interest credits. We use the certainty-equivalence framework to derive the subjective value of the guarantee perceived by the participant. Numerical results show that in many scenarios the subjective value is lower than the cost of the guarantee derived by option pricing approaches, implying that public sectors potentially spend too much in providing the guarantee. However, the subjective value could be higher than the cost of the guarantee under some scenarios, depending on the participant's level of risk aversion, the feasibility of diversification, and so forth.

We use a large sample of defined benefit (DB) pension plans to document economically significant differences in the risk-taking of plans sponsored by privately-held versus publicly-traded firms. The magnitude and the main determinants of pension plan risk-taking are different for public and private firms. The effect of pension liabilities’ funded status on risk-taking is two and a half times higher for plans with publicly-traded sponsors than for plans with private sponsors. In contrast, changing sponsor contributions has more than four times higher effect on risk-taking for plans with private sponsors. The results suggest that the alignment of incentives for the stakeholders in a pension contract is different for plans sponsored by private versus publicly-traded firms.

Traditional defined benefit (DB) pension plans remain the overwhelming norm for teachers, policemen and other employees of state and local governments. The incentives for workers with DB pension plans to stay in their jobs shift dramatically over the course of their careers. Moreover, limited transferability of pension wealth across states and between public and private jobs impedes mobility in the labor market. Yet, little is known about the labor market effects of pensions on state and local government workers. The literature on private-employer pensions has made contributions on some of these fronts in recent years that can shed light on policy concerns raised by the possibility that pension plans will be modified in coming years. Moreover, some of the limitations constraining research on pensions may be overcome by focusing on government workers, with recent work on public school teachers pointing the way. Very recent studies are finding strong retirement responses to age- and tenure-related incentives built into state pension plans.