The peseta was the Spanish currency for more than a century and, during this time, it played a remarkable role in adjusting the balance of payments. This paper presents a chronology of the moments when the adjustment was crucial, which, consistent with the macro-trilemma, coincided with periods of external openness. Moreover, this paper provides empirical support to the thesis that links the exceptionality of a floating peseta during the gold standard with fiscal profligacy.

This paper proposes a new interpretation for a main issue of modern Spanish monetary history. The Spanish legal monetary system became bimetallist, as result of the Figuerola Decree, in 1868. The bimetallist system in force throughout the XIXth Century allowed the Bank of Spain, as the Bank of France did, pay its notes with silver, gold or both. As a result there was neither an inconvertibility declaration, nor any imaginary gold standard was abandoned in 1883. Law and legal practice always guaranteed convertibility of the peseta, that can't be identified only with gold exchange. In Spain there was never a suspension of tender notes convertibility such as in Italy, Portugal, Austria or France.

The system of multiple exchange rates for the peseta, in force between 1948 and 1959, has posed many problems for Spanish historiography, in that it implies that the price at which foreign transactions were carried out is unknown, being hidden in the dense foliage of special exchange rates. In this paper we estimate the various average exchange rates series for all the Balance of Payments of these years, thus filling the vacuum that the post-Civil War period represents in the history of the peseta. We also calculate the real effective exchange rate, concluding that the important devaluations of 1949–1951 and 1957–1959 were insufficient in order to achieve equilibrium between Spanish relative prices and those of its main trading partners, so that the peseta remained continuously over-valued throughout the 1940's and 1950's.