This chapter outlines Plato’s metaphysics of artefacts on the basis of his explicit references to Ideas of artefacts in the Cratylus and Republic X, his discussion of the eidetic cosmos presented in the Parmenides and the description of the material world as a product of the divine artisan in the Timaeus. The second section presents the shortcomings of Plato’s account detected by Aristotle and addressed through artefacts: these are Plato’s failure to recognise final causes and the concept of imitation. The third section outlines the metaphysical intuitions upon which Aristotle builds by taking artefacts into account. The roots of certain metaphysical problems are not explicitly identified as Platonic, but they are arguably to be found in the Platonic corpus. These problems concern the range of things that have a form, the separation between axiology and metaphysics, the concept of real kinds and the relation between parts and whole.

This chapter introduces the book’s approach and its main theses, ending with an overview of the Phaedo. I argue that the dialogue has an unfolding structure, in which claims made early are often explained only at later stages. I briefly lay out the distinct stages of Socrates’ accounts of the forms, of the soul, and of ethics. These are not three independent topics; instead, his ethical account is grounded in his account of the soul, which is in turn grounded in his account of the forms. Another important thread running through the dialogue is how Socrates responds to Simmias’ and Cebes’ fears by trying to help them acquire the right sort of rational confidence in their views. I also discuss how Socrates appropriates and transforms ideas from his religious, scientific, and literary context in articulating and defending his philosophical theories.