Chapter 3 outlines our three conceptual innovations for the study of European integration and EU interventions in the socioeconomic field. First, we shift from the classical distinction of negative and positive integration to one that distinguishes horizontal and vertical integration modes. Second, we propose to go beyond the classical, state-centred (intergovernmental or federal) paradigms of EU law and political science, as we have found that the EU’s new economic governance (NEG) regime mimics the corporate governance regime that transnational corporations use to steer the activities of their subsidiaries and their workforce. Finally, we pursue an analytical approach that complements existing EU politicisation studies, which assess the salience of Eurosceptic views in media debates, opinion polls, elections, and referenda, as we must study EU politicisation also at the meso-level of interest politics. After all, the political cleavages that structure national politics have neither been created in individuals’ minds at the micro-level nor are they simply an outcome of systemic macro-level changes.

Chapter 14 concludes the book, highlighting its major theoretical and practical insights for the study of EU integration and for the prospects of democracy in Europe. The technocratic design of the EU’s new economic governance (NEG) regime eschewed citizens’ and workers’ political rights to have a say in policymaking; and the commodifying bent of its prescriptions eroded their social rights to be protected from the vagaries of the market. After the pandemic, the technocratic bent in EU economic governance endured, as the National Recovery and Resilience Plans were co-designed by national and EU executives without any meaningful input from unions and social movements, and without national parliaments and the European Parliament making any amendments. The commodifying direction of the NEG regime also endured post-Covid, albeit with some concessions, notably in employment relations. EU executives have had to face the prospect that the hollowing out of social rights that resulted from commodification is pushing electorates towards Eurosceptic parties. In the current unstable context, labour politics matters a lot. Unions and social movements are essential in framing the social and political struggles about the policy direction of EU economic governance along a commodification–decommodification axis rather than a national–EU politics axis.

This chapter discusses the roles of and relations between political parties, political groups and members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Domestic political parties play an important role because they are responsible for selecting the candidates for the European Parliament elections. Once elected, most of these political parties and their MEPs work together in political groups. In these political groups MEPs from like-minded parties organize their work and tend to vote as cohesive blocks. Political groups thus help to make the EP work in a much more effective manner than would be possible if the more than 200 parties that are represented there did not build coalitions. These political groups are organized along two main cleavages: a classic left–right cleavage as well as a more recent cleavage between groups that are more supportive and groups that are more critical of European integration. Finally, in addition to domestic parties, there are also European political parties. They have more limited tasks and mostly provide a platform for like-minded parties from the different member states.