This chapter discusses the contextualization of human traits in situations. Most of the research on contextualizing traits has, up to now, been centered on personality traits. Therefore, much of the examination is on how personality traits relate to situations, but it extrapolates those findings to virtues and discusses theory and research related to the contextualization of virtue traits. In the exploration of trait contextualization, the chapter clarifies that current understandings of traits do not take them to be simplistic behavioral tendencies that manifest despite contextual influences. Instead, the contemporary understanding of traits is that they are virtually always influenced by situational factors. It explores direct situational influence on action, the ways individuals influence situations, and three types of person–situation interactions. It then presents practical wisdom as a generally neglected feature of person-situation interactions. The chapter argues that practical wisdom's role in person–situation interactions goes beyond what shows up in personality research by clarifying that some individuals see more opportunities for virtue trait expression in situations than others. Moreover, this practical wisdom underwrites high-quality decision-making. It concludes by discussing how a virtue perspective adds important elements (agency, aspiration, and practical wisdom) to the contextualization of traits.

Empirical virtue researchers have not generally relied on robust virtue theory. Without a unifying theory of virtue, scientific studies have developed without guidance, and the result is a patchwork of relatively disconnected studies of specific virtues based on ad hoc assumptions about those virtues. Therefore, this chapter presents an ecumenical, realistic virtue theory as a conceptual foundation for empirical research in virtue science. It suggests that moral virtues are (1) acquired traits that are (2) manifested in behavior, (3) steered by knowledge, and (4) fully motivated. The virtue theory presented is inspired by philosophic work (primarily Aristotle and Confucius), but it does not engage in the contentious debates active in philosophical approaches to virtue, leaving aside the debates about the nature and importance of ideal human virtue and focusing on the ordinary virtues that are often ascribed to people who are morally good. We also discuss the important role of culture in virtue definition. Finally, we outline the four components of virtue: (1) behavior, (2) cognition, (3) emotion/motivation, and (4) practical wisdom.

This chapter discusses the field of moral development and explores what this research field can tell us about virtue development, which is a relatively neglected topic in virtue theory. The chapter is primarily about moral development in children, both because there is substantial scientific interest in this population and because virtue development must begin in childhood. Moral development research illuminates three apparently naturally developing preconditions for virtue development: (1) the ability to choose, (2) an interest in collective welfare, and (3) an interest in ethical normativity. Moral development research is also compatible with the STRIVE-4 Model in that it is primarily quantitative. Moral development generally does not focus on traits, with the exception of some research on moral identity, moral emotions, and moral exemplars. The chapter concludes by exploring how virtue science can contribute to moral development research, including an increased emphasis on (1) person-centered research, (2) the contextualizing of development in situations and roles, (3) flourishing, and (4) practical wisdom.

This chapter outlines several threads of personality psychology to explore what it can tell us about virtue science. Personality psychology includes structural approaches (e.g., Big 5 and HEXACO), process approaches (e.g., the Cognitive-Affective Processing System or CAPS), integrations of structural and process approaches (e.g., Whole Trait Theory and the Three-Tiered Framework of Personality), and an emerging focus on systematic changes in personality through the lifespan. This research has clarified that traits exist and are measurable, that traits relate predictably to meaningful outcomes, that informant reports correlate to self-reports on personality, and that personality emerges cross-culturally. CAPS was developed to account for situational variation in personality expression. The systematic developmental changes in personality suggest that individuals mature as they adopt important roles in life, such as work and mating relationships. The integrative approaches to personality highlight its multidimensional nature and make it reasonable to consider merging the study of personality and virtue. The chapter concludes by arguing that virtues and personality dimensions are sufficiently different because virtue science emphasizes morality, choice, and practical wisdom, whereas personality theory and research do not. It suggests that traits may be best understood as a genus with at least two species: personality and virtue.

Chapter summarizes how the limited available research on our proposed four components of virtue (behavior, knowledge, motivation/emotion, and practical wisdom) has been generally consistent with STRIVE-4 Model predictions. Observed behavior and motivation/emotion have been studied to some extent, but little research has evaluated virtue knowledge or practical wisdom. Like other areas of virtue scholarship, these four components are often studied in isolation, preventing a holistic understanding of virtues. Although the available evidence is consistent with these four components, the chapter suggests that an important step forward in virtue science is integrating the four components for a more complete understanding of virtue. To connect virtue science with neurophysiology, the chapter concludes by highlighting the limited work on the interface of virtue and neurophysiology.

This chapter discusses the contextualization of human traits in social roles. It begins by exploring how personality traits relate to social roles, then it extrapolates those findings related to virtues and discusses theory and research on social roles and virtue traits. The discussion of the social role contextualization is based on identity theory, which explains that social roles are repetitive patterns of action that are included in social structures and result in role identity formation in the individual. The chapter reiterates that up-to-date trait conceptualizations do not view them as simplistic behavioral tendencies that manifest in any social role. Instead, traits are currently understood as influenced by social role expectations. Practical wisdom plays a large part in the expression of virtues through social roles. Practical wisdom adds an element to virtue expression and social roles that is absent in personality research because some individuals see more opportunities for virtue trait expression within a role than others. It then clarifies this theoretical discussion with examples of common role and virtue enactments from the parenting, teaching, and healing roles. It concludes by discussing how a virtue perspective adds important elements (agency, aspiration, and practical wisdom) to the contextualization of traits.

The first commonly held thesis that prevents solving the Conjunctive Problem is the Divergence Thesis, according to which Aristotle thinks that it is possible to possess theoretical wisdom and reliably manifest it in contemplation without possessing practical wisdom and reliably manifesting it in ethically virtuous activities. This thesis, though widely endorsed on the basis of a single passage, is false. The apparent support provided by that passage fades away on closer inspection. Once freed from the restrictive grip of the usual interpretation, we are prepared to understand Aristotles distinctive account of the motivations of intellectually virtuous agents. His account invites us to revisit assumptions about what the ideal epistemic agent looks like that have figured prominently in recent experimental philosophy.

This chapter outlines contemporary research related to excellent and inadequate leadership. This research reveals some practical problems arising in leadership research and identifies important psychological issues that contribute to bad or toxic leadership. The concept of wisdom, including practical wisdom, is elaborated as an effective and ethical foundation of leadership theory and practice. Central to practical wisdom are wise reasoning and the ability to do things wisely, including doing leadership wisely. There is a discussion of issues related to developing wisdom generally, and then specifically in leaders and potential leaders. The chapter fills a gap in understanding how to develop wisdom in people so that they act wisely. The chapter will give you some ideas on how to develop your wisdom potential. Finally, we will discuss the implications of our views on leadership and wisdom before concluding with reflections on why we keep appointing/ voting for bad leaders.

Chapter abstract (Philosophical Foundations for the Study of Wisdom): A person with practical wisdom reliably grasps how to live and conduct themselves. But what is practical wisdom, how can we get it, and how can we study it? This chapter will introduce some prominent philosophical arguments and answers to these questions. After distinguishing practical wisdom from other types of wisdom, the chapter explains why studying wisdom requires combining both philosophy and empirical science. To illustrate the contribution of philosophy, the chapter motivates a core philosophical conception of wisdom and invites the reader to think through some philosophical puzzles it gives rise to.

Aristotle, in Nicomachean Ethics, wrote of the importance of what he called practical wisdom (phronesis) as a key guide to human action. Practical wisdom is the will to do the right thing in a given situation, and the skill to figure out what the right thing is. This chapter discusses what practical wisdom is, and illustrates why it is needed for successful practice in almost all professions. Will is essential because it keeps professionals on track to pursue the proper aims of a profession (eg., healing the sick and easing suffering, in medicine), and skill is important because every situation is different and professionals need empathy, improvisation, good listening, imagination, and perspective taking to find the actions that each situation requires.

Noga Ayali-Darshan covers the wisdom works and vernacular sayings of Syria-Palestine from the Late Bronze Age. This material exists in some form of Akkadian, including Sumero-Akkadian and Akkadian-Hurrian, all of which comes from sites at Ugarit and/or Emar. Darshan organises the works into four types: practical wisdom, critical wisdom, disputation poems and fables, and righteous sufferer compositions. Much of her chapter will introduce readers to the texts themselves, by way of their provenance, language and versions. Additionally, some thematic and particular linguistic reflections are given. In short, this chapter provides an introduction to an emerging and perhaps neglected area of wisdom from the biblical world.

In this chapter, I show how the contemplative ethics of Neoplatonism repurposes classical and Hellenistic ethics, advancing a new distinction between practical and theoretical wisdom. The classical and Hellenistic contrast between the bios praktikos and its attendant virtue phronesis, and the bios theoretikos together with its attendant virtue sophia, informs a half millennium or more of ethical thinking. In the discourse surrounding the competing value of these ethical registers, the practical life and the contemplative life, both ancient philosophers and their modern exegetes approach the theoretical life with trepidation, as if a certain amount of apology is owed for the practical limits of contemplative ethics. But such anxiety as to how the life of theoria can be valorised from the point of view of ordinary virtue is out of place when it comes to understanding the ethics of Plotinus and of Porphyry, at least in the Enneads and in the Sententiae. There is an important place for the practical life, if by practical we understand the development of the capacity for contemplation. As such, the practical side of this ethics is a form of mind training ,or even an ethics of concentration. Its complement, wisdom, theoretical virtue, or sophia, consists in insight, or knowledge of the nature of the real, together with realisation of the true self of the practitioner.

In Chapter 6, I consider how much integration of thought and feeling is required for a good character, and how much integration or disintegration of thought and feeling exists in the psyche of the bad person. Both discussions raise the question whether the good person has a pleasanter life than the bad person. I attempt to answer this question by distinguishing two levels of pleasure (and pain), and by applying Aristotle’s view that virtue is the measure of pleasure. The beginning of the chapter clarifies my view and addresses an objection that my account of the interdependence of thought, desire, and feeling in the good person is too demanding. My answer relies on Aristotle’s threefold analysis of a feeling as a physiological reaction, an impression of a salient consideration in the here and now, and a motivating desire to do this now. The good person can have physiological reactions without having a full feeling – so, for example, a good person may still be hungry even if she does not want to eat another chocolate now. The end of this chapter discusses the thought in thoughtfulness, addressing the objection that my account of the good person is not demanding enough.

addresses the question how one develops the correct (or incorrect) thought and feelings, a crux in Aristotelian scholarship, and how exactly thought and feeling become interdependent in the good person. When Aristotle says that thoughtfulness (phronēsis) comes mostly by teaching and that virtue of character comes by habituation, it may sound as if there are two processes taking place separately, one in relation to thinking and one in relation to feeling, with the process in relation to feeling coming first. I disagree, and show how virtues of thought like comprehension (sunesis) and consideration (gnōmē) emerge in habituation along with the correct feelings. I also discuss how one may become bad, using the case of Neoptolemus in Sophocles’ play Philoctetes, discussed by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics VII, to show how a young person’s thought and feeling can become interdependent even if they are thrown off track by pernicious influences like those of the lying Odysseus in this play. Finally, I argue that shame is not a separate stage in moral development.

For Paul, the social ethos of Christian communities grows directly out of Christ’s movement into the sphere of sin and death, there to rescue derelict humanity through the radical solidarity of the cross and the power of the resurrection. This movement reverses hierarchies and destabilizes social norms, in visible, counterintuitive ways: the inclusion of socially incompatible members, the redistribution of resources, solidarity with all humanity in its most desperate cry for liberation, and the creation of a fellowship in which diverse people with divergent backgrounds and different gifts grow together into moral agents shaped by Christ’s self-giving love.