Emotions have profound consequences for human functioning. Their influences can be adaptive, guiding people through life and ensuring effective functionality within society, but emotions can also result in irrationality and bias. This chapter focuses on the role of emotion in conspiratorial beliefs, using the QAnon conspiracy theory as an example. Within the chapter, we discuss affective factors that make QAnon appealing to its followers and the role of discrete emotions in the spread of misinformation and conspiratorial beliefs. The chapter also examines the influence of emotions on information processing. Given QAnon supporters’ strong emotional involvement in the movement, we discuss affective influences on information processing through the lens of affective polarization. In addition, we explain how emotions, particularly anger, influence the propensity towards extreme and sometimes violent action that has been on the rise among the followers of QAnon. The chapter concludes with a discussion of potential mitigating variables and strategies that might curb proliferation of QAnon.

The rise of QAnon in the US and abroad is best understood within a “socio-epistemic” context of hyper-polarized politics and populism, growing mistrust in authoritative sources of information, and the ubiquity of misinformation, especially from online sources. Although there has not yet been a systematic study of how people have come to be followers of QAnon, psychological research on conspiracy theories, cults, and “internet addiction” can inform applicable mechanisms of “recruitment” and “conversion.” Published anecdotal accounts likewise illustrate the process by which some individuals have fallen down the QAnon “rabbit hole.” Believers in conspiracy theories like QAnon can be modeled along a typological continuum that distinguishes “fence-sitters,” “true believers,” and “activists,” as well as “apostates” who manage to disaffiliate. “Clinical staging” of QAnon believers in this fashion might be useful in predicting effective interventions for those vulnerable or who succumb to belief in conspiracy theories.

Research suggests that people adopt conspiracy theories in an attempt to satisfy (1) existential (e.g., the need to feel secure and in control), (2) epistemic (e.g., the need to understand the world), and (3) social (e.g., the need to feel positive about one’s self or group) motives (Douglas et al., 2017). In this chapter, we consider the extent to which this framework can explain belief in the QAnon conspiracy theory specifically. QAnon beliefs appear to be driven by existential threats, such as the belief that there is a vast satanic paedophile ring which is being covered up by left-wing Hollywood elites. Regarding epistemic motives, such as the tendency to seek patterns where they do not exist, it becomes understandable why some people might be attracted by cryptic “Q Drops.” Finally, QAnon beliefs are typically right-wing and tend to point the finger towards the left-wing elite for all the alleged wrong-doings. QAnon beliefs, therefore, also appear to be socially motivated. Following the discussion, we outline the similarities and differences between QAnon and other conspiracy theories, and outline ideas for future research.

This chapter discusses the interaction between QAnon and the media. As the group turned from fringe to mainstream, it swamped social media. Eventually, social media companies had to take measures to stop the spread of disinformation associated with QAnon. Groups such as QAnon might use media to manipulate news frames and set agendas, which propels conspiracy-laden topics to mainstream media sources, and creates a platform for spreading disinformation. This chapter also examines how social media use relates to belief in conspiracy theories, and the potential consequences of exposure to conspiracy theories on social media platforms. This relationship between conspiracies, media, and disinformation is explored and applied to QAnon. A brief discussion of how QAnon is similar or different from other groups in their use of social media is offered, along with some research questions for future study about the QAnon movement.

Troublesome events are common in human groups, and humans respond to perceived dangerous situations by creating narratives that both give a name to the events and serve as one means of exercising control. We argue that conspiracy narratives are a distinctive type of danger narrative but also one that varies with the degree of alleged danger. These narratives are most likely to develop during periods of extreme social and cultural dislocation. QAnon is one in a succession of conspiracy narratives through American history, such as witchcraft narrative in 1692 Salem and the 1980s Satanic cult narrative, in which satanic figures are alleged to have invaded the everyday world with catastrophic results. It is a particularly important case as it can be analyzed in real time and it has reached an advanced level of narrative development. We identify core characteristics of advanced conspiracy narratives as revelatory framing, mythic themes, insurgent media network, and narrative radicalization. Narrative radicalization is particularly important as it involves blaming specific actors and attributing intentionality to their actions, which constitutes a bridge from narrative interpretation to social intervention.

Over the course of 2020, QAnon has repeatedly captured the news media’s attention more than ever as the group starts to move their activities from online chat boards into the offline world. With increased public attention, so too political commentators (expert and lay) increasingly refer to QAnon as a “cult” (Blazakis, 2021; Hassan, 2021). What is missing in the growing literature on QAnon is: (1) an examination of the movement within the context of the substantial academic literature on new religious movements and (2) use of this research to see whether labeling QAnon a “cult” or “new religious movement” makes sense in a comparative context. This is of particular importance not only because the use of these terms by the public is usually divorced from academic research on the topic, but also because the terms are often used as weapons to tarnish a movement that is considered to be deviant in some way. We argue that QAnon indeed has elements of a new religious movement, and note that treating it as such reveals insights for how the movement will evolve and develop over time.

Drawing on the themes of the previous chapters, this chapter considers the future of QAnon. It examines evidence of new and ongoing developments in the QAnon movement following the electoral loss of President Trump. QAnon has shown a particular ability to re-invent itself in the face of failed predictions, “frame bridging” or brokering ties with existing social networks and movements including lifestyle and wellness communities, anti-vaxxers, deep state conspiracists, radical religious right factions, Patriot and militia movement actors, and other conspiracy-minded groups. As such, QAnon has evolved and become a movement with a life of its own, independent of Trump. While Trump embraced conspiracy theories promulgated by QAnon such as the existence of a “deep state” intent on sabotaging the president’s policies, the range of conspiratorial ideas expand well beyond his administration. Herein, we explore indications of post-Trump era trajectories of QAnon from a social movement perspective, examining preliminary evidence of movement adaptation and change to shifting political conditions. These conditions include the political pressure exerted on major social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter to tamp down on misinformation freely circulated by QAnon followers, the election of Joe Biden and the transition to a new administration in the White House, the emergence of a QAnon religion, and the spreading influence of QAnon abroad, adapted and revised for different political environments.

Much effort has been spent trying to determine who ‘Q’ is, yet little is known about the characteristics of who follows ‘Q’ and QAnon. This chapter discusses the cognitive processes, cognitive biases, and traits (e.g., beliefs and individual characteristics) possibly associated with QAnon followers. Cognitive processes such as delusional ideation, teleological thinking, cognitive closure, and Pierre’s (2020) socio-epistemic model are examined in the context of QAnon followers, along with a variety of cognitive biases (e.g., groupthink, confirmation bias, jumping to conclusions bias). Additionally, traits such as being racist (e.g., holding anti-Black and anti-Semitic attitudes), narcissism, Machiavellianism, and political affiliations are possible common traits among QAnon followers. A brief discussion of how QAnon is similar or different from other groups (e.g., conspiracy or religious groups) is offered, along with some research questions for future study about QAnon specifically. This understanding is crucial, especially as QAnon followers are gaining political power and agency.

QAnon attracted considerable attention from politicians and the press during 2020. Headlines claimed that the group had exploded across social media platforms and was becoming mainstream; these claims were supported by instances of violence and studies of online activity. However, public opinion polls tell a different story. We examine polling data from 2018–2021 to understand the size and scope of QAnon support. Only 5–8 percent of the American public supports QAnon, making it one of the least supported conspiracy theories typically polled on. Moreover, support for the QAnon movement has remained stable over time, with no indication of becoming “mainstream.” We also find that QAnon support is less the product of left-right orientations, as often argued, than anti-establishment sentiments and anti-social personality traits. We argue that politicians strategically trafficked in QAnon rhetoric to expand their support, simultaneously activating a once irrelevant dimension of public opinion.

Humans have a deep longing and need for connection and a sense of belonging. Social groups provide safety, a sense of purpose, and identity, and fulfil the psychological need to belong. For many, that need is fulfilled through family, peers, co-workers and other pro-social institutions. But others struggle to find their place. The online space provides opportunities for people to connect with others, especially during times of physical disconnection yet it is vulnerable to misuse and manipulation. This chapter discusses the need for belonging, and how struggles to belong contribute to participation in anti-social groups such as gangs, cults, and conspiracy groups. Using QAnon as an example, this chapter illustrates how conspiracy groups provide a sense of community, as people find and create meaning around shared and constructed identities which can lead to personal and societal risks. The chapter demonstrates how the need for belonging intersects with various other factors, in potentially beneficial or detrimental ways.

This chapter examines research about recruitment to political and new religious movements from the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, contrasting those results with the meager research base on participants in QAnon, noting similarities and differences. The major finding from the earlier research was that young people participated of their own volition as an expression of their human agency. They were not “brainwashed”. This key finding is generally applicable to QAnon participants, although QAnon devotees are typically older and often were recruited through social media and the internet. Social psychological theories such as “foot-in-the-door” and what happens when prophecies fail are applied to QAnon recruitment as well. The chapter ends with suggestions for research needed to fully understand QAnon recruitment.

Chapter 7 analyzes misinformation and conspiracy theories as contemporary examples of fake news. These include the “death panels” controversy, the Obama “birther” conspiracy, Pizzagate, QAnon, and Covid-19–related myths and conspiracies. Not all conspiracy theories originate from the American right, although this chapter documents how the highest profile ones are embraced by right-wing media and the Republican Party. These conspiracies rise to prominence after being indulged by Republican officials, right-wing media outlets, and in social media. Social media increasingly serve as prime disseminators of reactionary conspiracies. I also examine how traditional “agenda setting” news media have held the line against these conspiracies, with consumption of these venues associated with increased rejection of the conspiracies. In contrast, social media consumption – in general and particularly for Republican Americans – is regularly associated with embrace of conspiracies. This rising culture of conspiratorialism has reached crisis levels with movements like QAnon, and with the Covid-19 pandemic and the failure of millions of Americans to take the crisis seriously or think about it in factual ways. In an era when traditional media gatekeepers are being pushed aside in favor of social media venues, people curate their own information and construct echo chambers, allowing conspiracy theories free reign.

This chapter turns to the dynamics of democratic discontent when it seizes power, focusing on Trump but referencing other cases where relevant. It analyzes the influence of Trumpism on the left and finds a mirror image to the dynamics in Spain, where the rise of left-wing populism provoked a populist backlash among the radical right. In the United States, extreme disgust with Trump’s agenda drove many further to the left, increasing leftist Democratic discontent. The second section analyzes the final months of the Trump presidency, as its response to the Covid-19 crisis faltered and Trumpism degenerated into an arcane morass of conspiracy theories. Using experiments and observational data from the PSAS, the chapter argues that pro-Trump conspiracy theories served as a coping mechanism for his followers. As the Covid-19 crisis ravaged both the lives and livelihoods of America, and as it became increasingly clear that Trump would not be reelected, the anxiety his followers felt, regarding a situation that their loyalty to the populist prevented them from accepting, became intolerable. Conspiracy theories allowed the followers to escape anxiety and embrace resentment by giving them targets for their rage.