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Collaborative climate governance has emerged as a promising approach to address the urgent need for decarbonization. Here, we summarize the book’s findings on the complex interplay between states and non-state actors in the pursuit of climate goals, using Sweden as a case study. Collaborative governance can effectively engage industry, cities, and other stakeholders in climate politics, yet it falls short in achieving transformative change. The success of collaborative climate governance is influenced by broader political, economic, and social context and calls for a critical examination of its applicability in diverse settings. Looking beyond Sweden, we identify three main research avenues. Firstly, we emphasize the need to engage with the challenge to institutionalize and sustain climate commitments. Secondly, we encourage scholars to explore democratic innovations to address contestation within collaborative governance. Finally, we call for a deeper exploration of how external shocks and crises serve as catalysts or barriers to decarbonization.
This book explores some implications of studying international relations from a systemic perspective. This chapter takes on the preliminary tasks of defining systems, identifying distinctive characteristics of systemic explanations, and situating systems approaches in a broader context of relational framings. A system is a bounded set of components of particular types, arranged in definite ways, operating in a specific fashion to produce characteristic outcomes, some of which are emergent. The arrangement and operation of the components produce “emergent” “systems effects;” properties and outcomes that cannot be fully understood through knowledge of the parts considered separately. I emphasize the relational character of systemic explanations and their reliance on mechanisms and processes, in order to foster developing a relational processual systemic perspective within a pluralistic IR.
The remaining chapters of this book begin to sketch a new systemic/relational perspective and illustrate some of its implications and attractions. Like systems approaches, relational approaches in contemporary IR, which employ frames such as networks, fields, practices, and assemblages, stress the arrangement of parts of wholes. A systems perspective, however, highlights a tendency among relationalists to overemphasize relations and underemphasize processes. (The frame “relationalism” draw attention away from processes and usually leaves obscure how relations and processes are related.) I argue for a systemic/relational perspective that understands social systems as configuring configurations that configure. And I argue that these hierarchically layered assemblages can best be understood through relational processual explanations.
The following article seeks to question the deterministic tinge behind entanglement fetishism, namely the celebratory, uninhibited, and totalising projection of the world as a relational wholeness. Alongside the rise of Anthropocene debates and the claimed incapacity of post-positivism to account for contemporary socio-natural transformations, the text embarks on two main goals. On the one hand, the article sketches a brief genealogy of processual and relational thinking, with a focus on International Relations (IR) literature. On the other hand, the text seeks to move forward critical engagements with the entangled grand narrative. To this end, the article exposes a problematic ontological assumption often overlooked by both entanglement fetishists and their critics: entanglements are infallibly generative, that is to say, they deterministically precipitate further beings and events. In doing so, the text invites IR scholarship to explore non-generative encounters and hence to address the question of the possibility of being without being in relation. Drawing from an unorthodox line of research, the article unearths non-relational, or beyond-the-relational, instances, whose engagement with an entangled world can only be materialised through the logics of subjugation. For this mode of being, the texts hints, non-engagement, refusal, and withdrawal become a form of political resistance and survival, thus distorting the controversial association between political subjectivity and emancipation.
Analogy is a core cognitive capacity encompassing basic similarity (“this is like that”), relational similarity (proportional analogies of the form A:B::C:x), and complex system mappings, in which the elements of one situation are structurally aligned with the elements of another. The latter permits complex inferences from a known source situation to a less familiar target situation. Because of its centrality in human thinking, analogy has been the subject of numerous computational modeling efforts. Models of similarity come from multiple traditions in cognitive science, including associationist approaches (such as connectionist models), “traditional” symbolic approaches (such as graph matching and production systems), and hybrid symbolic/connectionist approaches. This chapter reviews and evaluates several models from these various approaches in terms of their ability to simulate basic similarity, relational similarity, and system mapping.
The Charmides is a difficult and enigmatic dialogue traditionally considered one of Plato's Socratic dialogues. This book provides a close text commentary on the dialogue which tracks particular motifs throughout. These notably include the characterization of Critias, Charmides, and Socrates; the historical context and subtext, literary features such as irony and foreshadowing; the philosophical context and especially how the dialogue looks back to more traditional Socratic dialogues and forward to dialogues traditionally placed in Plato's middle and late period; and most importantly the philosophical and logical details of the arguments and their dialectical function. A new translation of the dialogue is included in an appendix. This will be essential reading for all scholars and students of Plato and of ancient philosophy. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Historically, philosophical discussions of relations have featured chiefly as afterthoughts, loose ends to be addressed only after coming to terms with more important and pressing metaphysical issues. F. H. Bradley stands out as an exception. Understanding Bradley's views on relations and their significance today requires an appreciation of the alternatives, which in turn requires an understanding of how relations have traditionally been classified and how philosophers have struggled to capture their nature and their ontological standing. Positions on these topics range from the rejection of relations altogether, to their being awarded the status as grounds for everything else, to various intermediary positions along this spectrum. Love them, hate them, or merely tolerate them, no philosopher engaged in ontologically serious metaphysics can afford to ignore relations.
Berkeley's likeness principle is the claim that ‘an idea can be like nothing but an idea’. The likeness principle is intended to undermine representationalism: the view (that Berkeley attributes to thinkers like Descartes and Locke) that all human knowledge is mediated by ideas in the mind that represent material objects. Yet, Berkeley appears to leave the likeness principle unargued for. This has led to several attempts to explain why Berkeley accepts it. In contrast to metaphysical and epistemological interpretations available in the literature, in this essay I defend a conceptual interpretation. I argue that Berkeley accepts the likeness principle on the basis of (1) his commitment to the transparency of ideas and (2) his account of resemblance, which he sets out in his works on vision. Thus, I provide an explanation for Berkeley's reasons for accepting the likeness principle that, appropriately, focuses on his views concerning ideas and likeness.
Recovery orientated care emphasizes equality in relations. Forensic psychiatric professionals need to engage in care-relationships with patients in ways where power is symmetrically distributed among them. However, professionals also need to focus on security at the ward. This promotes patient-professional power-relations that are asymmetrically skewed towards professionals. New practical ways of balancing between the power-relations defined by a care and custody dichotomy in forensic care need to be developed and studied to guide clinical practice.
Objectives
To study how power-relations are articulated between patient-professional within a social gaming activity (E – sport) in a Danish medium secure forensic psychiatric ward.
Methods
Three months of observational data, collected via anthropological fieldwork Interviews with 3 professionals and 6 patients Data was analyzed using sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s notions of field, capital and power
Results
The E-sport intervention consists of two fields “in-game” and “over-game” In-game concerns the practice of gaming Over-game concerns the interventions organization Power in each field is driven by specific values and access to certain competencies Power in-game was equally open to patients and professionals leading to symmetric power relations Power over-game was open to professionals only leading to asymmetrical power relations Professionals may allow power distribution to patients during gameplay, while still retaining the overall power over the intervention
Conclusions
It is possible to balance between care-and-custody in forensic psychiatry. This study provides important insights to guide further practice.
We unpack the role of sense of place in relation to urban experimentation. We conceptualise urban experimentation as a governance approach to foster and activate innovation capacities of communities and places for climate adaptation and institutional trialling of novel approaches. We focus on an urban living laboratory (ULL) as one specific type of urban experiment that has received increasing attention in European cities recently, and use experimentation in ULL as an example to reconsider a dynamic and pluralistic understanding of place. We find that our case study, BlueCity Lab in Rotterdam, NL provides a space where new place-related narratives of change, novel practices and relations emerge, while being embedded within wider, translocal networks of practice. Backed by these insights, we contend that a translocal, pluralised and dynamic concept of place promises to be a valuable lens in order to understand the impacts, manifestations and appropriate responses to global challenges in everyday life.
In this concluding chapter, I explore the implications of contractual theories’ failures to satisfactorily justify the robust moral status of PSID. Social contract theory can justify a robust moral status and meaningful social integration for many people with cognitive impairments. However, (1) not all PSID can fit within a contractual framework and (2) in many cases, there are salient facts about PSID that ought to guide their treatment and social integration. I suggest that relational or role-based accounts of morality offer a promising way to reconcile our seemingly conflicting intuitions about the grounds for the robust moral status of all human beings. I argue that we should not discard social contract theories, but rather give them their due place, which involves limiting them to the relations or circumstances to which they apply. I am not yet making the case for integrating theories of care ethics, concern, empathy, or fiduciary relations in a theory of justice, or in a parallel theory complementing it, but I deal with a few objections that social contract theorists may raise against such an endeavor.
As noted by Bauer, real dvandva compounds – that is, coordinative compounds that properly express the aggregation of two different entities, not the intersection of properties in one entity – are extremely rare in English and Spanish. This article explores the empirical domain of dvandva compounding in Spanish, and notes that they are productive when not used as heads within their phrases. We propose that the explanation for this is that Spanish can only productively build dvandva compounds using flat structures without internal hierarchy. This causes the compound to look externally for a head noun that defines the interpretation of the relation established between the two members of the dvandva. The proposal also explains why proper names are preferred in dvandva compounding, given that they do not denote properties.
This chapter discusses the central question why Aristotle, in spite of having everything required to conceptualize a complex measure of speed in terms of time and space, did in the end not explicitly develop such a measure. It is first investigated whether contemporaries of Aristotle may have worked with such a complex measure of speed, and concluded that it cannot be found in either of the two thinkers most likely to have done so, namely Eudoxus and Autolycus. The second part of the chapter investigates what made Aristotle cling to a simple measure and suggests that there are mathematical and metaphysical reasons: metaphysically, Aristotle cannot explicitly accommodate a relation as a measure of motion, since relations are derivative and problematic for him; mathematically, the principle of homogeneity which derives from the realm of Greek mathematics makes it impossible to combine of different dimensions in a single measure in the way needed for measuring speed in a mathematically informed physics such as Aristotle’s.
The extant attempts in the literature to refute the greatest difficulty argument in the Parmenides have focused on denying the parallelism between the pros relations among Forms and those among particulars. However, these attempts are unsatisfactory, for the argument can reach its conclusion that we cannot know any Forms without relying on this parallelism. I argue that a more effective strategy is to deny the more essential premise that the knowledge-object relation is a pros relation. This premise is false because pros relations require definitional and ontological codependence between the relata, and the knowledge-object relation does not satisfy this reciprocity condition.
Chapter 2 conceptualizes constitutional properties in both domestic and international settings. Drawing on domestic experiences, it defines constitutions, whether written or unwritten, as a special category of institutions that provide fundamental rules (of recognition and change) as well as rules that regulate a community of members, their relations, and their rights and duties (rules of conduct). It then identifies corresponding constitutional properties in the international setting, acknowledging the limits of this analogy. While still embryonic, international rules with constitutional relevance are especially apparent in those binding treaties of public international law that are universal in intended participation, global in scope, and of substantive importance. These rules are underpinned by the principle of sovereignty, which provides for their stability and superiority. International constitutional rules define states as the prime members, organize inter–state relations in an anarchical environment by concentrating authority in circumscribed domains, and lay out rights and duties that enable collective action and set standards of appropriate behavior.
Many of the central theses of Hume's philosophy – his rejection of real relations, universals, abstract objects and necessary causal relations – had precedents in the later medieval nominalist tradition. Hume and his medieval predecessors developed complex semantic theories to show both how ontologies are apt to become inflated and how, if we understand carefully the processes by which meaning is generated, we can achieve greater ontological parsimony. Tracing a trajectory from those medieval traditions to Hume reveals Hume to be more radical, particularly in his rejection of abstraction and abstract ideas. Hume's denial of general, abstract ideas is consistent with his philosophical principles but fails to appreciate the more sophisticated nominalist approaches to abstraction, the result of which is a theoretically impoverished account of our capacity for generalization.
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, we recall a collection of basic mathematical notions that are needed for the discussions of the following chapters. Second, we have a first, still purely mathematical, look at the central topics of the book: languages, relations and functions between strings, as well as important operations on languages, relations and functions. We also introduce monoids, a class of algebraic structures that gives an abstract view on strings, languages, and relations.
This essay focuses on the northeastern borderlands of the Central African Republic (CAR), an area that though formally part of a state is mostly left to its own devices. It has no single sovereign, but many people participate in the sovereign prerogative of enacting violence in such a way as to claim a right to determine how to live. These dynamics are particularly visible in the area's contests over armed conservation, my ethnographic and historical topic here. These sovereign claims take the form of denunciation: rallying people to take extreme measures against another whose egregious acts threaten fundamental values. In northeastern CAR, the value frequently fought for through denunciation is negative liberty—freedom from molestation for those who carve space for themselves by denouncing. In addition to excavating denunciation as a dynamics of sovereignty, this paper shows that the values motivating sovereign struggles can include not just autonomy—whether devoted to a principle of order or anarchy, as others have explored—but can also be devoted to creating exceptions for those who denounce, such that they are able to participate in projects and access terrains that extend beyond their place of residence without having to consistently abide by others’ rules. Denunciation is thus a dynamics of sovereign claim-making that can shape and mobilize solidarities that are in flux, rather than those calcified by the violent, exceptional decision of a unitary sovereign. Denunciation foregrounds relational and processual aspects of sovereignty and in so doing invites new comparisons.