Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 March 2021
In this concluding chapter, I explore the implications of contractual theories’ failures to satisfactorily justify the robust moral status of PSID. Social contract theory can justify a robust moral status and meaningful social integration for many people with cognitive impairments. However, (1) not all PSID can fit within a contractual framework and (2) in many cases, there are salient facts about PSID that ought to guide their treatment and social integration. I suggest that relational or role-based accounts of morality offer a promising way to reconcile our seemingly conflicting intuitions about the grounds for the robust moral status of all human beings. I argue that we should not discard social contract theories, but rather give them their due place, which involves limiting them to the relations or circumstances to which they apply. I am not yet making the case for integrating theories of care ethics, concern, empathy, or fiduciary relations in a theory of justice, or in a parallel theory complementing it, but I deal with a few objections that social contract theorists may raise against such an endeavor.
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