The global and historical entanglements between articifial intelligence (AI)/robotic technologies and Buddhism, as a lived religion and philosophical tradition, are significant. This chapter sets out three key sites of interaction between Buddhism and AI/robotics. First, Buddhism, as an ontological model of mind (and body) that describes the conditions for what constitutes artificial life. Second, Buddhism defines the boundaries of moral personhood and thus the nature of interactions between human and non-human actors. And finally, Buddhism can be used as an ethical framework to regulate and direct the development of AI/robotics technologies. It argues that Buddhism provides an approach to technology that is grounded in the interdependence of all things, and this gives rise to both compassion and an ethical commitment to alleviate suffering.

Discusses the global robotics industry, specifically how key foreign nations support commercial robots, while almost all of America’s vast spending on this technology goes to military and space exploration uses.

This introduction lays out various aspects concerning robots' entanglement with substantive law, including an all-round view of the criminal liability of humans for robots, the criminal responsibility of robots themselves, self-defense against robots, and robots as victims of crime. While Janneke de Snaijer and Marta Bo in their chapter discuss specific aspects of criminal liability and exemptions therefrom, Thomas Weigend analyzes the looming “responsibility gap” and the option of expanding the idea of corporate criminal responsibility to cover harm caused by AI devices. This is one aspect of a preventive, repressive, and long-term perspective on how criminal law can shape human–robot interaction, but also possibly an example of how the wish to regulate robots could affect criminal law itself.

This chapter describes five “action areas” in which politically achievable changes over the coming two decades could render humankind a lot safer than it is today. For climate change, these include urgent measures for rapid decarbonization, coupled with ramped-up research on technologies for carbon removal and for solar radiation management; new international pacts among small groups of nations for emissions reductions with mutual accountability and incentives; and pre-adaptation measures for dealing effectively with unavoidable harms caused by global warming. For nuclear weapons, these include preparing contingency plans for major or limited nuclear wars, as well as risk-reduction measures than can be implemented today. For pandemics, experts point to four sensible and affordable measures that would greatly reduce the harms of future pandemics. For AI, an immediate challenge will be to prepare for chronic mass unemployment due to rising levels of automation. Finally, the chapter proposes the creation of a new federal agency, the Office for Emerging Biotechnology, to oversee and regulate cutting-edge developments in this field.

The autonomy inherent in AI systems brings legal challenges. The reason is that it is no longer possible to predict whether and how explanations and actions emanating from AI systems originate and whether they are attributable to the AI system or its operator. The core research is whether the operator of AI systems is contractually liable for the damage caused by its malfunctioning. Is contract law sufficiently prepared for the use of AI systems for contract performance? The answer is provided through a review of the common law, CISG and the German Civil Code (BGB).

Robotic technologies have shown to have clear potential for providing innovation in treatments and treatment modalities for various diseases and disorders that cover unmet needs and are cost-efficient. However, the emergence of technology that promises to improve health outcomes raises the question regarding the extent to which it should be incorporated, how, made available to whom, and on what basis. Since countries usually have limited resources to favour access to state-of-the-art technologies and develop strategies to realize the right to health progressively, in this article, we investigate whether the right to health, particularly the core obligations specified under this right, helps implement medical robots.

Unlike privacy law discourse, which has primarily explored questions related to others’ knowledge, access, and use of information about us, commercial law’s central focus has been on issues related to trade involving persons, merchants, and entities. In the commercial law context, questions about knowledge and information are primarily connected to the exchange and disclosure of information needed to facilitate transactions between parties.1 This distinct historical focus has likely contributed to commercial law’s failure to adequately account for and address privacy, security, and digital domination harms. In some cases, commercial law also defers to corporate commercial practices as well.

This chapter, which considers selected Atwood texts over fifty years, focuses on sexual politics in her representations of women’s attempts to define and reclaim possession of their own bodies and identities. Within a framework that includes feminist theorists Simone de Beauvoir, Luce Irigaray, Joan Riviere, Andrea Dworkin, Susan Bordo, and Wendy Harcourt, the chapter considers the psychological and sociopolitical implications of body denigration. Signaling Atwood’s enduring motif of the disappearing female body without free will, from the early “mud poem” (1974), the chapter explores varieties of women’s self-obliteration and bodily reclamation in The Edible Woman and Lady Oracle, Gilead’s patriarchal domination over female bodies in The Handmaid’s Tale, women’s often ineffectual resistance to bodily objectification in Cat’s Eye and The Blind Assassin, and disturbing futuristic speculations on the possibility of complete possession of female bodies in Oryx and Crake and The Heart Goes Last through biotechnology and robotics.

Longitudinal research finds that thriving lives result from the capacity to form and sustain interpersonal relationships. This should not be left to chance or intuition but be treated as a matter of learning. The penetration of technology into every aspect of our lives has arguably put the development of empathy – the basis for good relationships – at risk. Although hyper-connected, people can feel very alone. The use of pornography is rising and gaming addictions and cyberbullying pose risks to young people. Empathy can and should be learned. In a context where our species is ageing, older generations are becoming cut off from families as living patterns change; and are suffering high levels of loneliness for longer periods. Well-designed learning experiences can close the gap between generations with reciprocal benefit. Therefore, the learning goals arising from attending to thriving at this level are: learning to develop loving and respectful relationships in diverse technologised societies; and engaging with and learning from other generations. The implications for educators are that social and emotional learning needs to be brought from the margin to the core

The final chapter of this volume provides several points of further theoretical elaborations, which, important for our overall argument, would have unduly cluttered the various chapters. It starts by considering how challenges to common sense arise from various types of dissent or deviance including children, homecomers, newcomers, strangers, foreigners, robots or aliens. It proceeds to discuss why and how object-relations and 'inter-objectivity' thought, noted by various scholars, have not received sufficient attention in psychological scholarship and certainly not in relation to influence by artefacts. The chapter lays out the theoretical foundations for such a broadening of scope. The chapter then proceeds to discuss the historically curious dominance of dual-process models over single-process alternatives. The excursions conclude by revisiting the debates concerning the authority of science in Milgram's obedience studies in light of a broader understanding of autonomy, tyranny, argumentation, legality and violence.

If you have ever wondered about the difference between “artificial intelligence” and “machine learning,” you are in luck. The purpose of this chapter is to provide background and context on key concepts in artificial intelligence (AI) and to touch on how AI tools are used in the financial markets. In recent years, hedge funds, banks, commodity trading advisors, and numerous other financial services firms have adopted AI systems and related tools from computer science to automate numerous aspects of their operations, so understanding basic AI concepts can provide insights into how these firms operate.