Problem: Why did the pilots do that? Human error is a reasonably common retrospective assignment of responsibility tied to undesirable aeronautical safety occurrences. Although retributive justice has long been accepted in aviation, its effectiveness in preventing recurrence is minimal. Airmen tend to decide based on their best knowledge with the available resources in intrinsically fallible systems in the ultra-safe high-risk aviation industry.

Method and Results: This paper sheds light on Safety as Capacity under the vanguardist Safety-II perspective and examines procedures as static tools incapable of sustaining safety. It discusses the prejudice in non-critical adherence to procedural compliance beyond creating bureaucratic work environments permissible to sanction workers against regulations. Disputing the safety gain in a retrospective analysis of mishaps, the paper instils the airmen as solution elements to sustain safety at the management of context, a fundamental aspect of Safety-II.

Impact on Industry: A systemic deficiency in civilian pilot training is exposed, and an independent organisational Safety Capacity assessment tool to air operations is provided. The main debate is the synergetic interaction between aircrew’s aeronautical decision-making skills and organisational Safety-II as safety capacity. The pilot’s preparedness to analyse, create and evaluate outside forecasted protocols in modern aviation environments is discussed. These dynamics are revised in their inter-reliability known as Safety as Capacity.