To improve public health and promote environmental sustainability, widespread dietary changes are necessary in high-income countries. However, adopting and maintaining dietary goals is challenging and requires repeated self-regulation. Effective public policies can facilitate healthy food choices and reduce the likelihood of goal failure. This study examines the relationship between individuals’ dietary goal failures and their acceptance of public food policies, using data from an experience-sampling study (Ni = 409 and Nobs = 6,447). Regression analyses revealed that participants who experienced more frequent dietary goal failures were generally less accepting of health-promoting food policies and perceived them as less effective. Additionally, perceived policy effectiveness positively predicted policy acceptance. Exploratory analyses showed that the negative relationship between dietary goal failure and food policy acceptance varied depending on the type of intervention (pull policies vs push policies) and the location of food selections (home vs out-of-home). Notably, we found a positive relationship between dietary goal failure and acceptance of pull policies for food selections made out-of-home. These findings highlight the importance of better understanding the complex interplay between public policy attitudes, the food environment and adherence to dietary goals.

Kieslich and Hilbig (2014) employ a mouse-tracking technique to measure decision conflict in social dilemmas. They report that defectors exhibit more conflict than do cooperators. They infer that cooperation thus is the reflexive, default behavior. We argue, however, that their analysis fails to discriminate between reflexive versus cognitively controlled behavioral responses. This is because cognitive conflict can emanate from resisting impulse successfully—or unsuccessfully.

Traditionally, information has been assumed to never harm consumers, a notion recently challenged. Salience nudges have been argued to evoke negative emotions, therefore acting as “emotional taxes”. I design a hypothetical restaurant meal experiment to analyze the emotional and short-term consumer welfare impact of a calorie salience nudge (calorie menu labeling) – a policy implemented nationwide in the U.S. in 2018. I find that a calorie salience nudge may act as an emotional tax, but only for some – there is considerable heterogeneity in the emotional response to the nudge. In particular, the nudge emotionally taxes people with low eating self-control, while it emotionally subsidizes those with higher levels of eating self-control. It therefore emotionally taxes the “right” people. However, people with lower levels of self-control may experience fewer benefits from the nudge – the nudge causes them to adjust their high calorie meal consumption by less than do those with higher self-control. It is therefore unsurprising that consumers with lower self-control attach a lower (a negative) value to the calorie salience nudge. Overall, the calorie salience nudge positively affects consumer welfare, although heterogeneity over consumers is substantial – the consumer value ranges from positive to negative. I find no distributional effects over income from the calorie salience nudge.

When people learn to make decisions from experience, a reasonable intuition is that additional relevant information should improve their performance. In contrast, we find that additional information about foregone rewards (i.e., what could have gained at each point by making a different choice) severely hinders participants’ ability to repeatedly make choices that maximize long-term gains. We conclude that foregone reward information accentuates the local superiority of short-term options (e.g., consumption) and consequently biases choice away from productive long-term options (e.g., exercise). These conclusions are consistent with a standard reinforcement-learning mechanism that processes information about experienced and forgone rewards. In contrast to related contributions using delay-of-gratification paradigms, we do not posit separate top-down and emotion-driven systems to explain performance. We find that individual and group data are well characterized by a single reinforcement-learning mechanism that combines information about experienced and foregone rewards.

We test in the context of a dictator game the proposition that individuals may experience a self-control conflict between the temptation to act selfishly and the better judgment to act pro-socially. We manipulated the likelihood that individuals would identify self-control conflict, and we measured their trait ability to implement self-control strategies. Our analysis reveals a positive and significant correlation between trait self-control and pro-social behavior in the treatment where we expected a relatively high likelihood of conflict identification—but not in the treatment where we expected a low likelihood. The magnitude of the effect is of economic significance. We conclude that subtle cues might prove sufficient to alter individuals’ perception of allocation opportunities, thereby prompting individuals to draw on their own cognitive resources to act pro-socially.

In 2020, most countries around the world adopted various measures aimed at combating the coronavirus (i.e., COVID-19), or reducing risky behavior which may spread the virus. In the current study (N = 215), we examined compliance with COVID-19 prevention guidelines using a risk-taking perspective, differentiating active from passive risk taking. In the corona context active risk taking involves actions that may cause disease contraction, such as shaking hands, while passive risk taking involves the acceptance of risk brought on by inaction, as in not using an alco-gel disinfectant. We found that personal tendencies for passive and active risk taking predicted passive and active corona related risk taking, respectively. Furthermore, compliance with COVID-19 prevention measures was also related to differences in self-control, with low Initiation self-control predicting passive corona risk taking and low levels of Inhibition self-control predicting active corona risk taking. Thus, while not complying with Covid-19 prevention measures put people at risk, differentiating between active and passive risks is helpful for accurate prediction of each type of risk behavior.

According to recent dual-process theories, interpersonal trust is influenced by both impulsive and deliberative processes. The present research explores the determinants of deliberative trust, investigating how trust decisions are affected by the availability of cognitive resources. We test the interaction of two relevant factors: self-control (the ability to exert mental control over one’s behavior) and the default response (a preselected option that requires minimal or no effort). Past research has shown that self-control has extensive effects on social behavior and decision making. Here, we report that the effect of self-control on trust depends on the default. Across two studies, we find no direct link between self-control and trust. Instead, self-control affects trust indirectly by influencing the level of effort in decision making. Poor self-control (due to experimental depletion or trait-based differences) predicts adherence to the default—the response that requires the least effort.

We conducted two studies using a sample of students (Experiment 1, N=84) and the general public (Experiment 2, N=412) to assess the relative and unique effects of factors suggested by three major theories of law obedience: a utility-theoretic deterrence theory (Becker, 1968), the general theory of crime (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990), and the legitimacy model (Tyler, 1990). Six different types of low-level crime were considered. The probability of breaking the law increases with factors predicted by each of these theories, namely detection probability, expected fine, self-control, and legitimacy. All four factors uniquely contribute to predicting law obedience, effects are mainly additive, and no stable interaction effects are observed. The relative influence of the investigated factors varies between types of low-level crimes. This indicates that an integrative theory of why people obey the law needs to consider factors from various theories and allow for the relative influence of factors to differ among crimes. We observe systematic deviations from a basic utility-theoretic approach to law breaking. Individuals’ tendency to obey the law is much higher than predicted by an approach taking into account detection probability, expected fines, and benefits only. The robust effects of interindividual differences concerning legitimacy and self-control as well as the finding that the tendency to break the law decreases with increasing benefit of the crime also conflict with a basic utility-theoretic approach to law-obedience.

Myrseth and Wollbrant (2015) offer an alternative theoretical explanation for our finding that defection entails more cognitive conflict than cooperation (Kieslich & Hilbig, 2014). Although we completely agree that different theoretical explanations for a result are possible, we maintain that the theoretical approach we tested (Rand et al., 2014) is parsimonious and falsifiable, excluding certain plausible results a priori. By comparison, the alternative framework proposed by Myrseth and Wollbrant requires several debatable assumptions to account for our findings, rendering it the more complex theory. Besides, their framework as a whole could have accounted for any possible finding in our experiment, making it impossible to falsify it with our data. We thus conclude that the notion by Rand et al.—that there is a spontaneous disposition to cooperate—has more empirical content while requiring fewer assumptions.

The aim of the current study was to examine whether self-control skills in childhood moderate the association between very preterm birth (<32 weeks of gestational age) and emotional problems and peer victimization in adolescence. We used data from four prospective cohort studies, which included 29,378 participants in total (N = 645 very preterm; N = 28,733 full-term). Self-control was mother-reported in childhood at 5–11 years whereas emotional problems and peer victimization were both self- and mother-reported at 12–17 years of age. Findings of individual participant data meta-analysis showed that self-control skills in childhood do not moderate the association between very preterm birth and adolescence emotional problems and peer victimization. It was shown that higher self-control skills in childhood predict lower emotional problems and peer victimization in adolescence similarly in very preterm and full-term borns.

Why do many societies moralize apparently harmless pleasures, such as lust, gluttony, alcohol, drugs, and even music and dance? Why do they erect temperance, asceticism, sobriety, modesty, and piety as cardinal moral virtues? According to existing theories, this puritanical morality cannot be reduced to concerns for harm and fairness: It must emerge from cognitive systems that did not evolve for cooperation (e.g., disgust-based “purity” concerns). Here, we argue that, despite appearances, puritanical morality is no exception to the cooperative function of moral cognition. It emerges in response to a key feature of cooperation, namely that cooperation is (ultimately) a long-term strategy, requiring (proximately) the self-control of appetites for immediate gratification. Puritanical moralizations condemn behaviors which, although inherently harmless, are perceived as indirectly facilitating uncooperative behaviors, by impairing the self-control required to refrain from cheating. Drinking, drugs, immodest clothing, and unruly music and dance are condemned as stimulating short-term impulses, thus facilitating uncooperative behaviors (e.g., violence, adultery, free-riding). Overindulgence in harmless bodily pleasures (e.g., masturbation, gluttony) is perceived as making people slave to their urges, thus altering abilities to resist future antisocial temptations. Daily self-discipline, ascetic temperance, and pious ritual observance are perceived as cultivating the self-control required to honor prosocial obligations. We review psychological, historical, and ethnographic evidence supporting this account. We use this theory to explain the fall of puritanism in western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies, and discuss the cultural evolution of puritanical norms. Explaining puritanical norms does not require adding mechanisms unrelated to cooperation in our models of the moral mind.