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NATO’s 1999 air campaign over Kosovo represents a rare example of a purely coercive air power campaign. Most coercive air campaigns are combined with a ground element, making it difficult to empirically distinguish the specific role played by air power. In Operation Allied Force, though, the prospect of a ground campaign was discussed and no meaningful ground threat materialized. There is also little evidence that Slobodan Milosevic perceived NATO was seeking to generate a threat of invasion. Accordingly, this is an unusual case of a significant military campaign that led to a successful outcome relying on air power alone. NATO did not plan for the campaign to last as long as it did, nor were plans in place that would have guaranteed the Western alliance’s desired outcome. Nevertheless, the campaign achieved NATO’s primary goals. It thus represents an example of a purely coercive military strategy leading to a successful result.
The Bosnian War (1992–95), fueled by complex alliances and deeply held animosity among the belligerents, bedeviled diplomatic resolution despite years of effort. In fall 1995, Operation Deliberate Force became the preeminent ingredient forcing warring factions to negotiate a settlement at the Dayton Peace Conference. Despite this success, airmen remain reluctant to claim Deliberate Force’s effectiveness because of its graduated, incremental, and restrained character. This ambivalence would have astonished earlier generations of airmen, who could only dream of such success.
The chapter examines discourses of comparison between Kosovo and Jerusalem invented by the Serbian nationalist movement arguably amidst the Yugoslav crisis in the 1980s. Serbian religious nationalism claims the territory of Kosovo as a holy land in ways that parallel Israeli claims to Jerusalem. This argument excludes the majority ethnic Muslim Albanians who live in Kosovo and claim political independence. Further, Serbs see themselves as collective victims like the Jews. Citing Israel as a role model for religious nationalist struggle and imitating Israeli policies toward Palestinian Muslims, Serbian claims are based on mythical historic rights, ancient religious claims, and preserved historic sites. The struggle for Kosovo as Jerusalem is cemented by religion and carried on by the Serbian Orthodox Church, which backed ethnic cleansing in the Balkan wars of the 1990s using these arguments. Counting on Israeli support for the Serbian cause, as evidenced by state and non-state visits of Israelis to Serbia, Serbian nationalism aims at making the conflict over Kosovo global.
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