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Historically, most intelligence theories include the personal intelligences that encompass apprehension of one’s own experience, the ability to understand and manage people, and insight into the states of other people. Intrapersonal intelligence enables an individual to cultivate self-awareness, which operates during transitions at three progressive levels. Self-knowledge is produced by reflective thinking and is the basis for growth and development. The capacity for self-assessment follows and evaluates strengths and weaknesses during a transition. This supports self-development, which turns awareness into action. Interpersonal intelligence enables an individual to empathize with others, manage relationships in mutually beneficial ways, give and receive feedback, and build collaborative relationships that develop and ultimately lead others. The personal intelligences are investigated through retrospective interviews with twenty-four elite performers in three domains (business, sports, and music) who successfully and repeatedly transitioned to higher positions within their field.
An increasingly common phenomenon in modern work and school settings is individuals taking on too many tasks and spending effort without commensurate rewards. Such an imbalance of efforts and rewards leads to myriad negative consequences, such as burnout, anxiety and disease. Here, we develop a model to explain how such effort–reward imbalances can come about as a result of biased social learning dynamics. Our model is based on a phenomenon that on some US college campuses is called ‘the floating duck syndrome’. This phrase refers to the social pressure on individuals to advertise their successes but hide the struggles and the effort put in to achieve them. We show that a bias against revealing the true effort results in social learning dynamics that lead others to underestimate the difficulty of the world. This in turn leads individuals to both invest too much total effort and spread this effort over too many activities, reducing the success rate from each activity and creating effort–reward imbalances. We also consider potential ways to counteract the floating duck effect: we find that solutions other than addressing the root cause, biased observation of effort, are unlikely to work.
While humans are highly cooperative, they can also behave spitefully. Yet spite remains understudied. Spite can be normatively driven and while previous experiments have found some evidence that cooperation and punishment may spread via social learning, no experiments have considered the social transmission of spiteful behaviour. Here we present an online experiment where, following an opportunity to earn wealth, we asked participants to choose an action towards an anonymous partner across a full spectrum of social behaviour, from spite to altruism. In accordance with cultural evolutionary theory, participants were presented with social information that varied in source and content. Across six conditions, we informed participants that either the majority or the highest earner had chosen to behave spitefully, neutrally or altruistically. We found an overall tendency towards altruism, but at lower levels among those exposed to spite compared with altruism. We found no difference between social information that came from the majority or the highest earner. Exploratory analysis revealed that participants’ earnings negatively correlated with altruistic behaviour. Our results contrast with previous literature that report high rates of spite in experimental samples and a greater propensity for individuals to copy successful individuals over the majority.
Results from cultural evolutionary theory often suggest that social learning can lead cultural groups to differ markedly in the same environment. Put differently, cultural evolutionary processes can in principle stabilise behavioural differences between groups, which in turn could lead selection pressures to vary across cultural groups. Separating the effects of culture from other confounds, however, is often a daunting and sometimes intractable challenge for the working empiricist. To meet this challenge, we exploit a cultural border dividing Switzerland in ways that are independent of institutional, environmental and genetic variation. Using a regression discontinuity design, we estimate discontinuities at the border in terms of preferences related to fertility and mortality, the two basic components of genetic fitness. We specifically select six referenda related to health and fertility and analyse differences in the proportion of yes votes across municipalities on the two sides of the border. Our results show multiple discontinuities and thus indicate a potential role of culture in shaping stable differences between groups in preferences and choices related to individual health and fertility. These findings further suggest that at least one of the two groups, in order to uphold its cultural values, has supported policies that could impose fitness costs on individuals relative to the alternative policy under consideration.
Knowledge and behaviour are transmitted from one individual to another through social learning and eventually disseminated across the population. People often learn useful behaviours socially through selective bias rather than random selection of targets. Prestige bias, or the tendency to selectively imitate prestigious individuals, has been considered an important factor in influencing human behaviour. Although its importance in human society and culture has been recognised, the formulation of prestige bias is less developed than that of other social learning biases. To examine the effects of prestige bias on cultural evolution theoretically, it is imperative to formulate prestige and investigate its basic properties. We reviewed two definitions: one based on first-order cues, such as the demonstrator's appearance and job title, and the other based on second-order cues, such as people's behaviour towards the demonstrator (e.g. people increasingly pay attention to prestigious individuals). This study builds a computational model of prestige bias based on these two definitions and compares the cultural evolutionary dynamics they generate. Our models demonstrate the importance of distinguishing between the two types of formalisation, because they can have different influences on cultural evolution.
Edited by
Jeremy Koster, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig,Brooke Scelza, University of California, Los Angeles,Mary K. Shenk, Pennsylvania State University
The chapter discusses the field of cultural evolution, which emerged in the wake of sociobiology and alongside evolutionary psychology and human behavioral ecology in the 1970s. Cultural evolution theory can be divided into three parts: investigating the genetic evolution of psychological capacities underlying culture, studying how populations adapt to their environments, and exploring how genes and culture influence each other’s evolutionary dynamics. The first sections of the chapter examine how human culture differs from nonhuman culture, why and how culture evolved in humans during the Pleistocene, how our cultural capacity predisposed us to be cooperative, and how cultural group selection created the conditions for the genetic evolution of prosocial preferences. Addressing a common criticism that cultural evolution focuses too heavily on mathematical modeling, subsequent sections showcase the recent explosion of empirical research that has been inspired by cultural evolutionary theory. This research is divided into three methods: fieldwork, experiments, and phylogenetics. The chapter concludes by noting that the dividing lines between cultural evolution and human behavioral ecology are blurring, with students of each subfield increasingly borrowing from the other, suggesting that these labels may soon be obsolete.
Gender role ideology, i.e. beliefs about how genders should behave, is shaped by social learning. Accordingly, if perceptions about the beliefs of others are inaccurate this may impact trajectories of cultural change. Consistent with this premise, recent studies report evidence of a tendency to overestimate peer support for inequitable gender norms, especially among men, and that correcting apparent ‘norm misperception’ promotes transitions to relatively egalitarian beliefs. However, supporting evidence largely relies on self-report measures vulnerable to social desirability bias. Consequently, observed patterns may reflect researcher measurement error rather than participant misperception. Addressing this shortcoming, we examine men's gender role ideology using both conventional self-reported and a novel wife-reported measure of men's beliefs in an urbanising community in Tanzania. We confirm that participants overestimate peer support for gender inequity. However, the latter measure, which we argue more accurately captures men's true beliefs, implies that this tendency is relatively modest in magnitude and scope. Overestimation was most pronounced among men holding relatively inequitable beliefs, consistent with misperception of peer beliefs reinforcing inequitable norms. Furthermore, older and poorly educated men overestimated peer support for gender inequity the most, suggesting that outdated and limited social information contribute to norm misperception in this context.
The harm principle sets a limit on the justified legal and social control of individuals. The principle also provides a widely accepted justification for such control. This chapter critically reviews John Stuart Mill’s understanding of the harm principle and the considerations he advanced in its support. It also draws on other discussions of the principle to assess its plausibility in general. Mill took the harm principle to be the sole ground for justified interference with the liberty of individuals, but less restrictive defenses of the principle are available. The content of the harm principle, on any of its formulations, is shaped by the characterization of harm that figures in it. A good characterization of harm should be both descriptively accurate and morally appealing, but these two desiderata can pull in opposing directions. This chapter argues that the characterization of harm that figures in the harm principle must advert to the grounds that justify the principle, but these grounds are multiple and can come into conflict. Mill presents both an autonomy argument and a social learning argument in support of the harm principle, but the ground of autonomy can speak in favor of interference in cases where the social learning argument speaks against it. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of harm, speech and offense.
An essential feature of human progress is the use of different modes of learning so agents acquire the appropriate behaviour to survive in a changing environment. Learning may result from agents who discover new knowledge on their own (individual learning), or imitate the behaviour of others (social learning). Social learning is less costly than discovery, but imitation might yield no benefit. Early theoretical models of a population consisting of purely individual and purely social learners found that both types are present in an evolutionary equilibrium. However, the presence of social learners did not provide any improvement to the average population fitness. Subsequent research showed that the presence of social learners could improve the average population fitness, provided that the pure characterisation of the agents’ learning is relaxed. We return to the pure conceptualisation of agents to challenge an assumption in the early work: agents were guaranteed enough resources to perform their desired learning. We show that, if the resources an agent receives are uncertain, this turns social learning into a source of fitness improvement at the population level. Perhaps counter-intuitively, uncertain provision of resources prompts an increase in the proportion of the population that pursues the costlier individual learning activity in equilibrium.
Both a serious academic text and an intriguing story, this seventh edition reflects a significant update in research, theory, and applications in all areas. It presents a comprehensive view of the historical development of learning theories from behaviorist through to cognitive models. The chapters also cover memory, motivation, social learning, machine learning, and artificial intelligence. The author's highly entertaining style clarifies concepts, emphasizes practical applications, and presents a thought-provoking, narrator-based commentary. The stage is given to Mrs Gribbin and her swashbuckling cat, who both lighten things up and supply much-needed detail. These two help to explore the importance of technology for simulating human cognitive processes and engage with current models of memory. They investigate developments in, and applications of, brain-based research and plunge into models in motivation theory, to name but a few of the adventures they embark upon in this textbook.
Humans have adapted to an immense array of environments by accumulating culturally transmitted knowledge and skills. Adaptive culture can accumulate either via more distinct cultural traits or via improvements of existing cultural traits. The kind of culture that accumulates depends on, and coevolves with, the social structure of societies. Here, we show that the coevolution of learning networks and cumulative culture results in two distinct pathways to cultural adaptation: highly connected populations with high proficiency but low trait diversity vs. sparsely connected populations with low proficiency but higher trait diversity. Importantly, we show there is a conflict between group-level payoffs, which are maximised in highly connected groups that attain high proficiency, and individual level selection, which favours disconnection. This conflict emerges from the interaction of social learning with population structure and causes populations to cycle between the two cultural and network states. The same conflict creates a paradox where increasing innovation rate lowers group payoffs. Finally, we explore how populations navigate these two pathways in environments where payoffs differ among traits and can change over time, showing that high proficiency is favoured when payoffs are stable and vary strongly between traits, while frequent changes in trait payoffs favour more trait diversity. Our results illustrate the complex interplay between networks, learning and the environment, and so inform our understanding of human social evolution.
This chapter reviews recent research on the relation between early social-cognitive development and the ontogeny of prosocial behavior. In particular, it focuses on action understanding, cognitive perspective taking, affective perspective taking, social learning, reciprocity, and strategic behavior, as well as self-related cognitive processes. For each aspect, central theoretical considerations and an overview of current empirical findings are presented. The chapter concludes with a discussion of implications of these lines of research for the promotion of early prosocial behavior.
For at least three million years, knapping stone has been practiced by hominin societies large and small, past and present. Thus, understanding knapping, knappers, and knapping cultures is fundamental to anthropological research around the world. Although there is a general sense that stone knapping is inherently dangerous and can lead to injury, little is formally, specifically, or systematically known about the frequency, location, or severity of knapping injuries. Toward this end, we conducted a 31-question survey of modern knappers to better understand knapping risks. Responses from 173 survey participants suggest that knapping injuries are a real and persistent hazard, even though a majority of modern knappers use personal protective equipment. A variety of injuries (lacerations, punctures, aches, etc.) can occur on nearly any part of the body. The severity of injury sustained by some of our participants is shocking, and nearly one-quarter of respondents reported having sought or received professional medical attention for a flintknapping-related injury. Overall, the results of this survey suggest that there would have likely been serious, even fatal, costs to knappers in past societies. Such costs may have encouraged the deployment of any social learning capacities possessed by hominins or delayed the learning or exposure of young infants or children to knapping.
Social learning is a critical adaptation for dealing with different forms of variability. Uncertainty is a severe form of variability where the space of possible decisions or probabilities of associated outcomes are unknown. We identified four theoretically important sources of uncertainty: temporal environmental variability; payoff ambiguity; selection-set size; and effective lifespan. When these combine, it is nearly impossible to fully learn about the environment. We develop an evolutionary agent-based model to test how each form of uncertainty affects the evolution of social learning. Agents perform one of several behaviours, modelled as a multi-armed bandit, to acquire payoffs. All agents learn about behavioural payoffs individually through an adaptive behaviour-choice model that uses a softmax decision rule. Use of vertical and oblique payoff-biased social learning evolved to serve as a scaffold for adaptive individual learning – they are not opposite strategies. Different types of uncertainty had varying effects. Temporal environmental variability suppressed social learning, whereas larger selection-set size promoted social learning, even when the environment changed frequently. Payoff ambiguity and lifespan interacted with other uncertainty parameters. This study begins to explain how social learning can predominate despite highly variable real-world environments when effective individual learning helps individuals recover from learning outdated social information.
Teaching is an important process of cultural transmission. Some have argued that human teaching is a cognitive instinct – a form of ‘natural cognition’ centred on mindreading, shaped by genetic evolution for the education of juveniles, and with a normative developmental trajectory driven by the unfolding of a genetically inherited predisposition to teach. Here, we argue instead that human teaching is a culturally evolved trait that exhibits characteristics of a cognitive gadget. Children learn to teach by participating in teaching interactions with socialising agents, which shape their own teaching practices. This process hijacks psychological mechanisms involved in prosociality and a range of domain-general cognitive abilities, such as reinforcement learning and executive function, but not a suite of cognitive adaptations specifically for teaching. Four lines of evidence converge on this hypothesis. The first, based on psychological experiments in industrialised societies, indicates that domain-general cognitive processes are important for teaching. The second and third lines, based on naturalistic and experimental research in small-scale societies, indicate marked cross-cultural variation in mature teaching practice and in the ontogeny of teaching among children. The fourth line indicates that teaching has been subject to cumulative cultural evolution, i.e. the gradual accumulation of functional changes across generations.
Sexual conflict is a thriving area of animal behaviour research. Yet parallel research in the evolutionary human sciences remains underdeveloped and has become mired by controversy. In this special collection, we aim to invigorate the study of fitness-relevant conflicts between women and men, advocating for three synergistic research priorities. First, we argue that a commitment to diversity is required to innovate the field, achieve ethical research practice, and foster fruitful dialogue with neighbouring social sciences. Accordingly, we have prioritised issues of diversity as editors, aiming to stimulate new connections and perspectives. Second, we call for greater recognition that human sex/gender roles and accompanying conflict behaviours are both subject to natural selection and culturally determined. This motivates our shift in terminology from sexual to gendered conflict when addressing human behaviour, countering stubborn tendencies to essentialise differences between women and men and directing attention to the role of cultural practices, normative sanctions and social learning in structuring conflict battlegrounds. Finally, we draw attention to contemporary policy concerns, including the wellbeing consequences of marriage practices and the gendered implications of market integration. Focus on these themes, combined with attendance to the dangers of ethnocentrism, promises to inform culturally sensitive interventions promoting gender equality worldwide.
Social learning describes any situation in which individuals learn by observing the behavior of others. In the real world, however, individuals learn not just by observing the actions of others, but also learn from advice. This chapter introduces advice giving into the standard social learning experiment of Çelen and Kariv (2005). The experiments are designed so that both pieces of information action and advice are equally informative (in fact, identical) in equilibrium. Despite the informational equivalence of advice and actions, we ... find that subjects in a laboratory social-learning situation appear to be more willing to follow the advice given to them by their predecessor than to copy their action, and that the presence of advice increases subjects’ ’welfare.
In this chapter we start by defining an intergenerational game and its equilibria. We then discuss conventions of behavior, their relationship to intergenerational-game equilibria, and what it takes to make such conventions stable. This is followed by describing the relationship between our use of the term “social learning” and what standard economic theory interprets it to mean. At the end of the chapter we discuss two other types of games, dynastic games (Anderlini, Gerardi, and Laguno, 2008) and overlapping generations games (Kandori, 1992), which also have generational structures.
It is widely agreed that all animals are entitled to some degree of welfare consideration, but that some are entitled to more consideration than others. However, the basis for singling out some animals for special consideration often seems to be mostly a matter of degree of similarity to, or association with, humans. A more reasonable criterion would involve the extent of suffering caused by given events. Two variables that seem likely to be very important in the extent of suffering are the capacity to anticipate and the capacity to recall. Everyday experience tells us that human suffering can be hugely amplified by either anticipation or recall of painful or distressing events. In the past, psychologists have tended to take the view that both these processes depend on the possession of language, and were therefore irrelevant to species other than humans. But comparative psychologists are increasingly making use of concepts from human cognition, including both memory and anticipation, to explain animals’ responses to both past and future events. These processes are invoked to explain the behaviour of a wide range of vertebrate species. Recent work on primate cognition indicates that more elaborate forms of representation may be possible in the great apes. Such evidence should be used as the basis for deciding whether to give special welfare consideration to certain species which have special cognitive capacities — or indeed enhanced welfare consideration to a wider range of species, if their cognitive capacities are found to be more sophisticated than is generally assumed.
Our study of economic prehistory begins with mobile foraging in the Upper Paleolithic. Foraging bands can obtain food from various natural resources. At a given point in time, some resources are actively exploited while others are latent. Social learning improves techniques specific to the exploited resources but with diminishing returns over time. Societies can experience lengthy periods of technological stagnation where latent resources are not used due to inadequate techniques, but techniques do not improve because these resources are not used. A positive climate shift can increase the standard of living in the short run, generating population growth in the long run. Agents then exploit previously latent resources, broadening the diet. Once new resources are in use, learning by doing raises productivity in the very long run, causing more population growth, until a new equilibrium is reached with an increased population and wider diet. The expansion of technological knowledge creates a ratchet effect where a return to the original climate regime need not imply that population or diet breadth will return to their initial levels. These mechanisms can explain how humans migrated into more severe environments over time without reference to resource depletion due to overharvesting.