This chapter explores the place of compromise in transitional justice. While all-pervasive in politics, compromise is a neglected topic, almost a non-topic, within the current transitional justice literature. The chapter is an attempt to reverse this tendency and rehabilitate the notion of compromise. If, as pluralists hold, we are often faced with cases of hard moral choices where, whatever we do, something of value is irreparably lost, then the best we can hope for is some kind of acceptable compromise between clashing goods. The question about the limits of compromise thus features centrally in this chapter. How far should transitional societies go in their willingness to compromise? When is a compromise acceptable, fair, guided by principle, and when is it rotten to the core, simply illegitimate? To what extent is it acceptable to compromise deeply held values such as justice and truth for the sake of other equally important values such as, say, civil peace and democracy? While doubtful that we can settle such issues once and for all, the chapter identifies a range of questions that should be part of the collective conversation about when a political compromise is acceptable and when it is not. The discussion begins, however, with a concrete historical figure, the communist leader Joe Slovo, who played a critical role in South Africa’s negotiated transition from apartheid to democracy. Slovo’s reflections on the nature and limits of compromise in the South African context serve as a central reference point for my discussion throughout this chapter.

Scholars are increasingly taking note of a species of government institutions that fall outside the traditional separation of powers and have come to be known as the “fourth branch”: these institutions are created by constitutional design to engage in independent oversight and investigation of the other branches. Using South Africa as a case study of “fourth branch” institutions, this chapter dives deeply into the South African cases on corruption (such as the Scorpions litigation, set in its political background) before turning to the more general theme of Chapter 9 institutions in South Africa, then surveying the rise of the furth branch in constitutional systems around the world. The chapter concludes by evaluating both the value and the limits of the “deep dive” case study approach to understanding topics in constitutional design.

In relation to foreign relations, South African courts have traditionally tended not to interfere with the executive. In the time before the democratic constitutional dispensation, foreign affairs was regarded as a prerogative of the executive on which the judiciary could not adjudicate. In the post-democratic dispensation, courts have held all exercise of public power, including in foreign relations, to be subject to judicial scrutiny. Yet, even then, a wide margin of discretion has been extended foreign affairs. In more recent years courts appear to be pulling back on the margin of discretion. This chapters reviews the recent jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court in matters relating to foreign relations and assesses the erosion of the discretion of the executive in foreign relations and whether this means the emergence of the judiciary in foreign relations.

Arthur Chaskalson was appointed by President Nelson Mandela in 1994 as the first head of the newly created Constitutional Court of South Africa. As a consequence of his distinguished record as a leading human rights practitioner during the dark days of apartheid, he brought both moral and intellectual stature to the leadership of the new apex Court. During the decade of his leadership, the Court fashioned a coherent body of jurisprudence that gave meaningful content to a constitutional text that was passed into law in 1996. He was the social leader of the Court, ensuring that it became a cohesive and efficient institution for the vindication of constitutional rights. At the same time, from its inception, he was the intellectual leader of the Court. This was first evident in his judgment in S v Makwanyane (1995) in which he developed a new legal paradigm for constitutional adjudication in a decision that declared the death penalty to be unconstitutional.