Functional psychology was less a system than an attitude that valued the utility of psychological inquiry. Assuming a philosophical underpinning from the pragmatism of William James and Charles Sanders Peirce, functional psychology fit well into the pioneering spirit of America. From its beginning, functional psychology had a clear emphasis on applying psychology to individual and social improvement, as was evident from the works of Münsterberg, McDougall, and Hall. The tradition of British natural science and evolutionary theory was integrated into psychology in the views on adaptation championed by the Chicago functionalists, such as Dewey, Angell, and Carr. Mental testing and the study of human capacity constituted important areas of investigation among the Columbia functionalists, represented by Cattell, Thorndike, and Woodworth. Although its reaction to structural psychology kept functional psychology from developing a systematic alternative model of psychological inquiry, this phase of American psychology resulted in two critical benefits. First, functionalism firmly entrenched the new science of psychology in America and imposed on it a particular American orientation toward applied psychology. Second, functional psychology provided a necessary transition from the restricted context of structural psychology to more viable models of psychology, permitting the science to progress.

Behavioral psychology was immediately preceded by the reflexology of Russian physiology and the associationism of Thorndike. Physiological reflexology received a sound foundation with the works of Sechenov and Bekhterev, but it was Pavlov who proposed a comprehensive theory of conditioning. Watson’s behavioral formulation defined stimulus and response elements as the substitute to rid psychology of residual mentalistic constructs. Watson’s contemporaries, Holt, Weiss, Hunter, and Lashley, soon restored to behaviorism critical psychological activities. The logical positivist movement expressed an operational spirit and insured the initial success of the behaviorist model. Behavioral psychology expanded beyond the original formulations of Pavlov and Watson. Contemporary reflexology in Russia and in nearby countries expanded to include a wide range of psychological and physiological problems, led by such eminent scientists as Vygotsky, Luria, Konorski, Asratyan, and Beritashvili. In the United States, behaviorism moved through several intellectual stages, through the contributions of Guthrie, Tolman, Hull, and Skinner. A major application of behaviorism was the behavior modification model in clinical settings. Contemporary behaviorism remains a dominant but diffused force in psychology.

Thorndike believed that reinforcement was an essentially simple process in which the reinforer stamped in an association between the preceding stimulus and response (S-R theory). Tolman disagreed, arguing that reinforcement was a more sophisticated process in which animals formed expectations that the response would produce the reinforcer. Behaviorists at first rejected the postulation of mental states, but both sides eventually agreed that it was acceptable to talk about invisible events (intervening variables), provided that they were couched in clear theories that led to testable predictions. This requirement proved difficult to satisfy, but it now looks as if Thorndike and Tolman were both right; evolution first produced a relatively simple associative system in which learning can occur without our awareness, but also to a more sophisticated system based on expectations. When several reinforced responses are available, the matching law says that we will distribute our responses to match the relative rates of reinforcement they have produced in the past. Kahneman and Tversky proposed an alternative analysis, that we use mental short-cuts or heuristics to make choices, partly based on emotions. Kahneman later proposed two systems, an unconscious system which generates intuitions, and a conscious system that may then modify them.

Noah Webster’s first dictionary, A Compendious Dictionary of the English Language (1806) was the first significant dictionary by an American. His blue-backed speller, The American Spelling Book (1783) was already, after the Bible, the most popular book ever published in America. So his authority and reputation on matters linguistic were already firmly established in the public mindset by the time he published An American Dictionary of the English Language in 1828. It became a blueprint for how Americans might embrace their linguistic differences from Britain and use them to define a national identity. Webster’s dictionary beckoned a new era in national dictionaries beyond British shores. In addition, his lexicographic practice pioneered innovations in methodology that anticipated mainstream dictionary practice in twentieth-century America. This essay investigates Webster’s important contribution to English lexicography and the standardisation of American English, and compares it with the work of his competitor Joseph Worcester whose Comprehensive Pronouncing and Explanatory English Dictionary (1830) sparked vehement accusations of plagiarism in what became known as ‘the dictionary wars’. The chapter highlights the contribution of other American lexicographers such as Isaac Funk and Edward L. Thorndike, Willian Dwight Whitney, William A. Craigie, Calvert Watkins, Mitford M. Mathews, Frederic G. Cassidy, and Philip Gove.