The UK's Trade Remedies Authority (TRA) conducts economic assessments of the ramifications of trade remedies, the Economic Interest Test (EIT). Such assessments are not mandated by the World Trade Organization but are conducted by certain trade remedy investigating authorities, including those of Brazil, Canada, the European Union, and New Zealand. The EIT is a mandatory part of the UK trade remedy system and is arguably more transparent than similar interest tests conducted by other trade remedy investigating authorities. However, stakeholder participation remains a challenge and the TRA is working on ways to improve participation. To date, the TRA has completed 11 EITs in its trade remedy cases, with a further ten live cases. These cases cover different products, markets, and countries, across which the likely positive and negative impacts of trade remedy differ. This paper invites experts to review the TRA's EIT methodology.

This article reviews Adam Smith’s clearly articulated views about the desirability of free trade and his equally strong view on the necessity of sound institutions and ‘the tolerable administration of justice’ as key ingredients of successful economic management. It starts with Smith’s views on free trade and shows how pertinent they are to today’s high-level trade policy challenges. It then considers a more detailed day-to-day instrument of policy—the Trade Remedies Authority (TRA). Following Brexit, the TRA was created as an arms-length body for investigating cases for granting temporary import restrictions to specific products according to a reasonably well-defined objective process. The article demonstrates how, over the first 2 years of its life, the TRA has been reduced from a useful administrative instrument to a fig leaf for a political process for granting protection to petitioners. Unfortunately, this tendency to displace analytical approaches to policy by purely political ones can now be observed in many activities of UK governance.

Unhappy with the rulings of the WTO dispute settlement system, which disproportionately targeted US use of trade remedies, the United States ended the entire system in 2019. There are multiple hurdles to agreeing to new terms of trade remedy use and thus potentially restoring some form of binding dispute settlement. First, a change would affect access to policy flexibility by the now large number of users of trade remedies. Second, although China's exports are the overwhelming target of trade remedies, exporters in other countries increasingly find themselves caught up in trade remedy actions linked to China. Third, critical differences posed by China's economic model may call for new rules for trade remedies, but no consensus on those rules has emerged. Even some of the most promising reforms have practical limitations, create additional challenges, or may be politically unviable.

The Appellate Body (AB) report in Korea–Pneumatic Valves is among the most structurally complex of recent trade remedies reports. The AB weaves a complicated web to explicate the intricacies of the relationship among the relevant provisions on injury determination in anti-dumping disputes in the midst of a contentious and long-running series of disputes between two close regional trading powers. This Article first examines the Korean investigation and its significance in economic terms. Second, it analyzes the AB's conclusions on Article 6.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding regarding the panel request and the significance of the AB's treatment. Third, it studies the AB's comments on the panel's anti-dumping calculations where the AB amplifies its prior pronouncements on the elements of injury and causation. Finally, the Article situates this dispute in the broader political debates playing out both at the AB and between the two disputing parties.