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French North Africa (AFN), a complex constellation of tribes, cultures, and religions, was viewed as the Hexagon’s strategic hinterland. However, from 1942, the war’s momentum would thrust it into the front lines. Roosevelt’s policy had been to entice Vichy back into the war on the Allied side. When that collapsed, Washington’s target became Maxime Weygand, whose reputation as anti-German did not, alas, make him pro-Allied. When Weygand was recalled, both the Americans and the British looked for a French leader whom they could champion as a replacement for both Vichy and de Gaulle. Henri Giraud seemed to be the man who could bring together a conspiracy of Vichy dissidents in AFN orchestrated by American Consul in Algiers Robert Murphy, whose “actionable intelligence” that AFN stood ready to welcome the Allies with open arms helped to convince Roosevelt to launch Torch – the Allied invasion of AFN. Vichy counted on l’armée d’Afrique to defend AFN against an Allied invasion. However, that force had been undermined by defeat, honeycombed with Gaullist dissidence, and riven by racial and professional animosity. Darlan was utterly clueless about the looming Anglo-American invasion. More presciently, Juin believed that an Axis invasion of Tunisia was more likely. But Darlan forbade him to defend it, evoking the protection of the 1940 armistice. Vichy continued to view the war as deadlocked. As a result, Torch caught Vichy and AFN completely by surprise. Furthermore, their chain of command in AFN was reorganizing, which further confused the response.
After following the retreat to Dunkirk, and the evacuation by sea of thousands of British and French soldiers, Chapter 4 examines the impact of Weygand’s command. Weygand’s organization of his so-called “hedgehogs” on the Aisne supposedly revived French resolve and resilience. In fact, examination of the archives reveals that these “hedgehogs” were improvized and most collapsed quite quickly. Second, more concerned with an imaginary communist uprising in Paris rather than prolonging French resistance to an inexorable German advance, Weygand’s defeatism and fear of popular insurrection became a major catalyst in France’s decision to request an armistice. The chapter concludes with a summary of the maneuvers and calculations in the French cabinet and High Command that scuppered the opportunity to fight on from the colonies and solidified support for the armistice.
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