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The Armistice of Mudros, signed on 30 October 1918, was perceived as an end to a never-ending nightmare by the Ottoman Armenians. The first chapter focuses on the political efforts of the Ottoman Armenian community leadership in a post-war atmosphere following the Armistice of Mudros. Benefiting from a comprehensive analysis of news items, editorials, and reports published in the Armenian and Ottoman Turkish papers, the chapter reflects the peculiarities of the Armenian political position during the first two years of the Armistice period. This chapter provides an analysis of the pro-independence approach of the Ottoman Armenians.
The Great War was not only about acquiring territories, it was also about political beliefs, juridical norms, economic interests, within but also outside Europe, in a world still largely dominated by the major European powers. This chapter discusses the largely competitive and mutually influenced definition of war aims on both sides, and the secret and complex peace feelers and clandestine diplomacy which took place during the war. The immediate influence of Wilson, through the immediate weight of US economic power and its financial aid to the Allies, and the prospect of a serious military contribution from 1918, forced the warring nations to take Wilsonian principles into account in their definition of war aims. An inter-Allied conference in London at the beginning of December 1918 had settled the location for the Peace Conference and the broad lines of the programme, generally following the proposals of French diplomacy.
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