The chapter assesses the Taiwanese leniency programme. Taiwan incorporated a leniency programme into the Taiwan Fair Trade Act in 2011. Since it became operational in 2012, the leniency programme has been used fifteen times. Out of these fifteen leniency applications, three applications have led to a decision. Noticing that financial rewards are not really assisting the leniency applications, the chapter investigates whether the low number of decisions could be attributed to the design of the leniency programme. This is done based upon the checklist of effective leniency programmes created by the International Competition Network. The main conclusion drawn is that the leniency programme may only be moderately effective. The chapter further argues that lawyers have identified the following elements as exacerbating the bad conceptualisation of the leniency programme: uncertainty about the calculation of the fines, access to the leniency dossier by third parties, and uncertainty on how the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission deals with cartel cases in general. Another concern that the chapter ascertains is the lack of awareness in Taiwan about the disputable character of cartels.