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1 results

  • 4 - Institutions

  • from Part II - Populist Influence on Competition Law Systems
  • Maciej Bernatt
  • Book:
    Populism and Antitrust
    Published online:
    17 February 2022
    Print publication:
    24 February 2022, pp 66-125

  • Summary

    Chapter 4 is focused on the analysis of the influence populists’ rule has on two institutions: competition agencies and courts. It examines the competition agency’s independence, operating capabilities, mandate, and judicial review of the agency’s actions. In each of these areas the exact manifestations of the influence of populists’ governments on the institutional organization of competition law systems are scrutinized. The discussed manifestations include: a politically driven appointment process, the limited autonomy of decision-makers, leadership changes, staff fluctuation and decrease in expertise, scarce resources, prioritization of consumer protection, the scope of the agency’s mandate, and weakening of the independent and expert character of judicial review.