In the last two decades, a robust consensus has emerged among philosophers of science, whereby political, ethical, or social values must play some role in scientific inquiry, and that the ‘value-free ideal’ is thus a misguided conception of science. However, the question of how to distinguish, in a principled way, which values may legitimately influence science remains. This question, which has been dubbed the ‘new demarcation problem,’ has until recently received comparatively less attention from philosophers of science. In this paper, I appeal to Rawls’s theory of justice (1971) on the basis of which I defend a Rawlsian solution to the new demarcation problem. As I argue, the Rawlsian solution places plausible constraints on which values ought to influence scientific inquiry, and, moreover, can be fruitfully applied to concrete cases to determine how the conflicting interests of stakeholders should be balanced. After considering and responding to the objection that Rawls’s theory of justice applies only to the “basic structure” of society, I compare the Rawlsian solution to some other approaches to the new demarcation problem, especially those that emphasize democratic criteria.

This article examines how global constitutional norms are received and reconfigured by South Asian judiciaries. It makes two central claims. First, it argues that India, as the largest state in the region, acts as a filter through which Bangladesh and Sri Lanka receive both structural and rights-based global norms. Second, it contends that Bangladeshi and Sri Lankan courts adopt distinct approaches to the Indian case law. While Bangladesh mostly converges with the Indian jurisprudence, Sri Lanka engages with it but does not wholly adopt its conclusions. The article puts forward a preliminary explanation for these distinct approaches based on differences in the constitutional structures and political histories of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka vis-à-vis India.

The major aim of this article is to show that John Rawls’s theory of justice cannot be applied effectively to questions of business ethics and corporate governance. I begin with a reading of Rawls that emphasizes both the critical and pragmatic nature of his theory. In the second section I look more closely at the notion of society’s “basic structure” and its place within Rawls’s theory. In the third section, I argue that “the corporation” cannot be understood as part of this basic structure and is not, therefore, a subject of justice for Rawls or his interpreters. Finally, I show that Rawls’s inability to speak to the corporation is a weakness, regardless of one’s particular view on the corporation. I conclude by considering what Rawls’s theory helps us to understand about the problems involved in integrating corporate governance, business ethics, and political philosophy.

The distinction between strong and weak judicial review occupies a privileged place in comparative constitutional law. This article argues that it is necessary to generate a new typology that includes two other increasingly influential models. The two ‘new’ models can be identified as ‘strong basic structure review’ and ‘weak basic structure review’. The former, present in some common law countries such as India and Belize, not only provides judges with the ability to strike down legislation that is inconsistent with a particular constitutional provision, but also constitutional amendments incompatible with the principles on which the constitution rests. The latter model, weak basic structure review, currently present in some Latin American countries, also provides judges with the power to strike down ordinary and constitution-amending legislation, but gives ‘the people’, acting through a constituent assembly, the final word on the validity of any form of positive law. Finally, the article considers the possibility of the development of a fifth model in which even the constituent people would be bound by certain principles to be identified and enforced by judges.

This paper re-examines the import of Rawls’s theory of justice for private sector institutions in the face of the decline of the welfare state. The argument is based on a Rawlsian conception of justice as the establishment of a basic structure of society that guarantees a fair distribution of primary goods. We propose that the decline of the welfare state witnessed in Western countries over the past forty years prompts a reassessment of the boundaries of the basic structure in order to include additional corporate institutions. A discussion centered on the primary good of self-respect, but extensible to power and prerogatives as well as income and wealth, examines how the legislator should intervene in private sector institutions to counterbalance any unfairness that results from the decline of the welfare state.