We have previously argued thatbehavioral scientists have been testing and advocating individualistic (i-frame) solutions to policy problems that have systemic (s-frame) causes and require systemic solutions. Here, we consider the implications of adopting an s-frame approach for research. We argue that an s-frame approach will involve addressing different types of questions, which will, in turn, require a different toolbox of research methods.

Traditional approaches for evaluating the impact of scientific research – mainly scholarship (i.e., publications, presentations) and grant funding – fail to capture the full extent of contributions that come from larger scientific initiatives. The Translational Science Benefits Model (TSBM) was developed to support more comprehensive evaluations of scientific endeavors, especially research designed to translate scientific discoveries into innovations in clinical or public health practice and policy-level changes. Here, we present the domains of the TSBM, including how it was expanded by researchers within the Implementation Science Centers in Cancer Control (ISC3) program supported by the National Cancer Institute. Next, we describe five studies supported by the Penn ISC3, each focused on testing implementation strategies informed by behavioral economics to reduce key practice gaps in the context of cancer care and identify how each study yields broader impacts consistent with TSBM domains. These indicators include Capacity Building, Methods Development (within the Implementation Field) and Rapid Cycle Approaches, implementing Software Technologies, and improving Health Care Delivery and Health Care Accessibility. The examples highlighted here can help guide other similar scientific initiatives to conceive and measure broader scientific impact to fully articulate the translation and effects of their work at the population level.

Recent meta-analyses suggest that certain drugs act as cognitive enhancers and can increase attentional investment and performance even for healthy adults. The current review examines the potential of behavioral economics enhancers (BEEs) for similarly improving cognitive performance and judgments. Traditionally, behavioral economics theory has adopted a skeptical approach regarding the notion of whether individuals can overcome judgment biases through variables that increase cognitive effort. We focus mostly on the effects of two BEEs: incentivization and losses. Summarizing results from different meta-analyses, we find a small but robust positive effect size for BEEs, with comparable effect sizes to those found in studies of pharmacological cognitive enhancers.

Recent work has argued for a Hayekian behavioural economics, which combines Austrian economics with behavioural economics as developed by Kahneman, Thaler, Sunstein, and others. We suggest that this hybrid is misguided because it relies on individual cognitivism. This view of cognition is incompatible with the Hayekian view of cognition which treats rationality as an emergent phenomenon of social interaction in an institutional environment. This Hayekian view, which we call epistemic institutionalism, is compatible with an alternative prominent perspective in psychology, that of the extended mind, sometimes known as 4E cognition. We demonstrate how the Hayekian perspective on individualism, the price system, and the evolution of rules can be connected to the extended mind programme, through concepts such as the coupling of the individual and their environment, cognitive off-loading, and affordances. We suggest that this alternative combination of Austrian economics and psychology provides a more fruitful way forward, especially because it foregrounds the processes of learning, error-correction, and institutional orders, rather than choice, bias, and individual rationality. To explain why Austrian economists have been receptive to behavioural economics, we distinguish epistemic institutionalism from the (radical) subjectivist approach, which shares key assumptions of individual cognitivism.

Delay discounting—the extent to which individuals show a preference for smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards—has been proposed as a transdiagnostic neurocognitive process across mental health conditions, but its examination in relation to posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is comparatively recent. To assess the aggregated evidence for elevated delay discounting in relation to posttraumatic stress, we conducted a meta-analysis on existing empirical literature. Bibliographic searches identified 209 candidate articles, of which 13 articles with 14 independent effect sizes were eligible for meta-analysis, reflecting a combined sample size of N = 6897. Individual study designs included case-control (e.g. examination of differences in delay discounting between individuals with and without PTSD) and continuous association studies (e.g. relationship between posttraumatic stress symptom severity and delay discounting). In a combined analysis of all studies, the overall relationship was a small but statistically significant positive association between posttraumatic stress and delay discounting (r = .135, p < .0001). The same relationship was statistically significant for continuous association studies (r = .092, p = .027) and case-control designs (r = .179, p < .001). Evidence of publication bias was minimal. The included studies were limited in that many did not concurrently incorporate other psychiatric conditions in the analyses, leaving the specificity of the relationship to posttraumatic stress less clear. Nonetheless, these findings are broadly consistent with previous meta-analyses of delayed reward discounting in relation to other mental health conditions and provide further evidence for the transdiagnostic utility of this construct.

Behavioral economics has become a dominant set of theories in explaining economic behavior, yet such behavior remains under the limited purview of psychological, cognitive, or neural approaches. This article draws on and extends Viviana Zelizer's social meaning of money framework in conjunction with new work in ‘relational accounting’ to suggest a sociological counterpoint, focusing in particular on the social and symbolic meaning attached to individual 401(k) retirement accounts. Following a market downturn, neoclassical and behavioral economics predict various types of behavioral responses, in particular loss aversion - where investors seek to increase risk-taking rather than locking in a sure loss (a loss is more painful to bear than an equivalent gain). A sociological theory that understands the shared meaning of retirement saving would predict something different, a behavior I call durable conservatism. In this article, I show how this concept better explains observed risk behavior in Americans’ 401(k) accounts following the 2002 and 2008 bear markets in stocks, and how that response differed from the behavior documented in non-retirement brokerage accounts.

Why are take up rates incomplete or low when the relevant opportunities are unambiguously advantageous to people who are eligible for them? How can public officials promote higher take up of opportunities? All over the world, these are challenges of the first order. There are three primary barriers to take up: learning costs, compliance costs, and psychological costs. These costs lower the net expected benefit of opportunities, and reduce participation in otherwise advantageous programs. Fully rational agents would consider these costs in their take up decisions, and in light of behavioral biases, such costs loom especially large and may seem prohibitive. Experimental and other evidence suggest methods for reducing the barriers to take up and the effects of behavioral biases. Use of such methods has the potential to significantly increase access to a wide range of opportunities that would increase individual well-being and social welfare.

This paper shows how social structure shapes many behaviors of low-income Black peoples’ currently labeled “culture.” It refutes both culture of poverty arguments based in welfare dependency and deindustrialization explanations of the post-1960 increase in single-parent Black families. Historically, distinct discrimination experiences in urban versus rural Black enclaves structured distinct child socializations and Black family formations, North and South. Agrarian enclaves socialized conformity to two-parent-families and racist labor markets; urban enclaves socialized resistance to racially stratified labor markets to preserve self-worth, destabilizing families. Any census measure of pre-1960 Black family structure averages low mother-only rates among rural socialized Blacks and high rates among urban socialized Blacks. The 1960-1980 doubling (21% to 41%) of Black children in one-parent families emerged from urbanization converging Blacks toward urban socialized Blacks’ historically high rate. Post-1970 welfare liberalization and/or deindustrialization were exacerbating factors, not causes. Using a family head’s urban/rural residence at age sixteen to proxy socialization location, logistic regressions on 1960s census data confirm hypothesis.

Adopting eco-friendly technologies, such as converting lawns to alternative low-input grass species, can reduce household expenditures and mitigate negative environmental impacts at the same time. However, the rate of adoption of these technologies has not been as high as expected. This study develops a behavioral framework to identify barriers to new technology adoption by incorporating both prospect theory and present bias. We apply the framework in a choice experiment to investigate the relative importance of several factors that shape decisions associated with adoption of low-input turfgrass. We find that loss aversion plays a significant role. Though consumers exhibit present bias, long-term benefits still matter to them. Insights from the behavior model suggest that marketing and government programs that promote cost–benefit-efficient technologies should focus on eliminating or reducing potential losses caused by product failure.