Public choice theory suggests that citizens have a deficit bias: they approve governments for running large deficits that increase spending or reduce taxes. In contrast, others contend that citizens reward governments for balanced budgets. We contribute to this debate by modelling a popularity function for the Canadian federal government and show that the impact of fiscal policies on the executive's popularity changes over time. Until the early 1990s, Canadians preferred budget deficits. As deficits became unsustainable during the economic crisis of the early 1990s, the government shifted its fiscal policy paradigm, as balancing the budget became its primary fiscal objective and citizens were actively concerned about the deficits. Since 1993, citizens’ deficit bias morphed into an austerity bias: executive approval increases when deficits are reduced. These findings contribute to comparative political economy research by assessing how policy regimes and public preferences reinforce each other.

The incoming Labour Government of 1997 promised a new approach to the conduct of fiscal policy. Two lessons to be learnt from previous experience were: (1) adjust for the cycle and build in a margin for uncertainty; (2) set stable fiscal rules and explain clearly fiscal policy. Although the claims for novelty were exaggerated there was a serious attempt to expand the supporting explanatory material at the time of the Budget and the Pre-Budget Report (which was itself an innovation). It started well, with the most significant tightening of fiscal policy occurring in 1997–8; but it ended with a record postwar deficit, a debt/GDP ratio heading for more than 75 per cent of GDP and the suspension of the fiscal rules. While the Treasury was not alone in failing to forecast the financial crisis and its consequences, doubts about the policy were being raised before 2007. Although the fiscal rules were met over the preceding period and projected to be met in future, a succession of current budget deficits and a tendency, from 2001 onwards, for over-optimism in fiscal projections left the UK less well equipped than it might have been to meet the challenges of the crisis.