Political opposition to fiscal climate policy, such as a carbon tax, typically appeals to fiscal conservative ideology. Here, we ask to what extent public opposition to the carbon tax in Canada is, in fact, ideological in origin. As an object of study, ideology is a latent belief structure over a set of issue topics—and in particular their relationships—as revealed through stated opinions. Ideology is thus amenable to a generative modeling approach within the text-as-data paradigm. We use the Structural Topic Model, which generates word content from a set of latent topics and mixture weights placed on them. We fit the model to open-ended survey responses of Canadians elaborating on their support of or opposition to a carbon tax, then use it to infer the set of mixture weights used by each response. We demonstrate this set, moreso than the observed word use, serves efficient discrimination of opposition from support, with near-perfect accuracy on held-out data. We then operationalize ideology as the empirical distribution of inferred topic mixture weights. We propose and use an evaluation of ideology-driven beliefs based on four statistics of this distribution capturing the specificity, variability, expressivity, and alignment of the underlying ideology. We find that the ideology behind responses from respondents who opposed the carbon tax is more specific and aligned, much less expressive, and of similar variability as compared with those who support the tax. We discuss the implications of our results for climate policy and of broad application of our approach in social science.

The plan to introduce a carbon pricing scheme in Australia has focused attention on the future relevance and necessity of using other policy instruments to reduce carbon emissions. Significant reports, including the Wilkins Review and reports by the Productivity Commission, have argued using the standard neoclassical economics framework that once a carbon price is established, it should be (almost) the only instrument needed to tackle climate change mitigation in Australia. With a small number of exceptions for complementary instruments to address some market failures, the use of other climate policy instruments, it is argued, will result only in unnecessary duplication and potential distortions. The aim of this article is to show that there are, in fact, a significant number of rationales for implementing several climate policy instruments in combination with a carbon price, and we should not be too quick to dismiss certain climate policy instrument combinations.

We are now close to reaching what climate scientists advise is a ‘tipping point’ when the injuries we have visited on the planet will become self-reinforcing and produce an ecosystem that is alien to human life. The mal-distribution of consumption within and between nations is a major reason why there is little agreement on appropriate remedial action. Ensuring planetary survival while reducing inequity is made the more difficult, because the richest one-seventh of the world’s population has already reached consumption levels beyond the capacity of the planetary ecosystem to accommodate it.

Normative theories of democracy agree that public demand should be the main guide in policymaking. But positive theories and related empirical research disagree about the extent to which this holds true in reality. We address this debate with an empirical focus on climate change policy. Specifically, we are interested in whether observable variation in public demand for climate change mitigation can help explain variation in adopted national climate policies. Using our own data to approximate public demand, we estimate the responsiveness of policymakers to changes in public demand in six OECD countries from 1995 to 2010. We find that policymakers are responsive and react in predicted ways to variation in our opinion component of measured public demand, rather than to the mere salience of the climate issue. The effect of issue salience is strongest in combination with our opinion measure as this creates a scope for action. The results underscore the importance and usefulness of our concept and empirical measures for public demand, as well as of our disaggregated analysis of climate policy outputs in this area.

Complex environmental challenges cut horizontally across sectors and vertically across levels of government. To address them in coordinated and integrated ways, governments have resorted to integrated, multi-sectoral strategies since the 1990s. After introducing this new governance approach, we describe the policy rationale, prevalence, governance characteristics and performance of three distinct yet thematically related, integrated strategies on sustainable development, climate change mitigation and adaptation in the EU-15 countries. Based on this literature-based synthesis, we highlight their similarities and differences and the lack of linkages between them. The concluding discussion explores options on how to develop integrated strategies further. Since all three integrated strategies failed as comprehensive governing processes that aim to better coordinate policies, we suggest recalibrating them towards communication so that they can be more effective in pursuing the functions they can realistically fulfil: providing direction and raising awareness.