Divine determinists face several problems related to divine commands, the divine will, and divine blame. First, if God sometimes wills that divine commands are broken (which seems to be the case if divine determinism is true) then the original act of command seems to be deceptive. Two other problems come from further considering the conflict between divine commands and the divine will. First, if there is such a conflict, then the deliberating agent who aims to obey divine commands and fulfill the divine will seems to face a problem, and if the divine will is followed above all, then the agent seems able to justify any course of action. Second, contrition ordinarily seems to include a desire that the previous bad action had not been performed, but given divine determinism, this seems to amount to a wish that the divine will had not been fulfilled. This seems impious. The final worry to be considered is that in determining agents to perform evil actions, God seems to have lost the standing to blame and punish them for these very actions. In this chapter I investigate each of these four objections, considering possible lines of response to each.