Though the term “empathy” is relatively recent, there has been a long history of valuing the ability to share a target’s feelings. For example, in the Analects, Kǒngzĭ (Confucius) says, “My way [dào] is one thing.” One of his disciples explains, “The way [dào] of Heaven is loyalty and empathy [shù, 恕].” However, several influential writers have recently argued against empathy. The seventh chapter takes up and seeks to refute the main arguments of such anti-empathy writers as Paul Bloom and Jesse Prinz, along with related arguments by Breithaupt and others. For the most part, my contention is that the arguments at issue actually suggest the need for more empathy, not less. Many of the arguments show the problems with spontaneous empathy. But the whole point of an ethical advocacy of empathy is that we should not rest content with spontaneous empathy but should undertake the effort to extend empathy (e.g., to members of out-groups).

The seventh chapter follows the pattern of extending and specifying theoretical points through the close interpretation of a literary work, in this case Tony Kushner’s widely admired, award-winning treatment of the AIDS crisis, Angels in America. This chapter also develops a concept of “critical empathy,” designed to respond to some potential problems raised by critics of empathy. Critical empathy involves effortful compensation for empathic biases (e.g., the saliency of the target or his or her in-group status). It also involves attention to ameliorating the condition of the targets of empathy, rather than brooding on shared emotional pain. In relation to these points, the chapter articulates a distinction between normative outcomes (the objective conditions that we would judge to be consistent with ethical imperatives, whatever their motivations) and ethical choices (the decisions that derive from ethical motivations, whatever their results). Additionally, the chapter considers the dynamics and ethical implications of guilt, shame, and attachment bonding.