According to decades of research, whether negotiations succeed depends on how much of the stake each person will get. Yet, real-world stakes often consist of resources that vary on quality, not just quantity. While it may appear obvious that people should reject qualitatively inferior offers, just as they reject quantitatively unequal offers, it is less clear why. Across three incentive-compatible studies (N = 1,303) using the ultimatum game, we evaluate three possible reasons for why people reject qualitatively unequal negotiation offers (that are 50% of the stake): fairness, mere inequality, or badness. Data across the three studies are consistent with the fairness account. Casting doubt on the possibility that people reject qualitatively unequal offers merely because they are ‘bad’, Studies 1 and 2 found that participants were more likely to reject the same coins when these were inferior (e.g., 200 × 5¢ coins) to the negotiation partner’s coins (e.g., 5 × $2 coins) than when both parties received the same undesirable coins (e.g., both received 200 × 5¢ coins). Supporting a fairness explanation, rejection rates of the qualitatively inferior offer were higher when the proposal came from a human (vs. a computer), suggesting that rejection stemmed in part from a desire to punish the negotiation partner for unfair treatment (Study 3). Nevertheless, some participants still rejected the unequal offer from a computer, suggesting that mere inequality matters as well. In sum, the findings highlight that quality, not just quantity, is important for attaining fair negotiation outcomes.

Governments interact strategically with sovereign bond market creditors: they make choices not only about how often and how much to borrow, but also under what terms. The denomination of debt, in domestic or foreign currency, is a critical part of these terms. The “original sin” logic has long predicted that creditors have little appetite for developing-country government debt issued in domestic currency. Our novel data, including bond issues by 131 countries in 240,000 primary market transactions between 1990 and 2016, suggest otherwise. Domestic-denominated bonds have come to dominate the market, although domestic-currency issuance often is accompanied by shorter bond maturities. We argue that ideologically rooted policy preferences play an important role in this unexpected trend in denomination. All else equal, right governments choose foreign denomination as a means of mitigating currency risk and thus minimizing borrowing costs. In contrast, left governments opt for the flexibility of domestic denomination, and they are better able to act on their preferences in the presence of risk-mitigating monetary institutions and macroeconomic stability. We find support for our argument that partisanship has a robust and enduring relationship with denomination outcomes, even in a marketplace in which domestic-denominated developing-country sovereign bonds have become the norm.

Seventeenth-century Iberian and Italian Scholastics had a concept of a truthmaker (verificativum) similar to that found in contemporary metaphysical debates. I argue that the seventeenth-century notion of a truthmaker can be illuminated by a prevalent seventeenth-century theory of truth according to which the truth of a proposition is the mereological sum of that proposition and its intentional object. I explain this theory of truth and then spell out the account of truthmaking it entails.