We study the poor-biased model for money exchange introduced in Cao & Motsch ((2023) Kinet. Relat. Models 16(5), 764–794.): agents are being randomly picked at a rate proportional to their current wealth, and then the selected agent gives a dollar to another agent picked uniformly at random. Simulations of a stochastic system of finitely many agents as well as a rigorous analysis carried out in Cao & Motsch ((2023) Kinet. Relat. Models 16(5), 764–794.), Lanchier ((2017) J. Stat. Phys. 167(1), 160–172.) suggest that, when both the number of agents and time become large enough, the distribution of money among the agents converges to a Poisson distribution. In this manuscript, we establish a uniform-in-time propagation of chaos result as the number of agents goes to infinity, which justifies the validity of the mean-field deterministic infinite system of ordinary differential equations as an approximation of the underlying stochastic agent-based dynamics.

Considering macroeconomies as systems subject to stochastic forms of entropic equilibria, we shall consider how deviations driven by positive feedbacks as in a speculative bubble can drive such an economy into an anti-entropic state that can suddenly collapse back into an entropic state, with such a collapse taking the form of a Minsky moment. This can manifest itself as shifts in the boundary between the portion of the income distribution that is best modeled as Boltzmann–Gibbs and that best modeled as a Paretian power law.

In this paper we are concerned with a model in econophysics, the subfield of statistical physics that applies concepts from traditional physics to economics. Our model is an example of an interacting particle system with disorder, meaning that some of the transition rates are not identical but rather drawn from a fixed distribution. Economical agents are represented by the vertices of a connected graph and are characterized by the number of coins they possess. Agents independently spend one coin at rate one for their basic need, earn one coin at a rate chosen independently from a distribution ϕ, and exchange money at rate µ with one of their nearest neighbors, with the richest neighbor giving one coin to the other neighbor. If an agent needs to spend one coin when his/her fortune is at 0, he/she dies, i.e. the corresponding vertex is removed from the graph. Our first results focus on the two extreme cases of lack of cooperation µ=0 and perfect cooperation µ = ∞ for finite connected graphs. These results suggest that, when overall the agents earn more than they spend, cooperation is beneficial for the survival of the population, whereas when overall the agents earn less than they spend, cooperation becomes detrimental. We also study the infinite one-dimensional system. In this case, when the agents earn less than they spend on average, the density of agents that die eventually is bounded from below by a positive constant that does not depend on the initial number of coins per agent or the level of cooperation.