By integrating role theory and social identity theory, this study examines the differential effects of organizational identification of the chief executive officer (CEO) and the chief financial officer (CFO) on corporate philanthropy. We argue that CEO organizational identification can positively affect corporate philanthropy, whereas the opposite holds for CFO organizational identification. This is because the CEO and the CFO have varying attitudes about corporate philanthropy owing to their different role expectations; thus, those who identify strongly with their organizations would act for the best interests of the firm. Moreover, because the beliefs of top executives are probably influenced by those of other executives, we further explore the interaction between the CEO and the CFO. We propose that the positive influence of CEO organizational identification on corporate philanthropy will be weakened by CFO organizational identification, and the moderating effect of CFO organizational identification will become stronger when the CEO and the CFO have opposite genders or when the CFO has ownership. From a sample of 880 publicly traded firms in China, we found support for our hypotheses. Our study can contribute to the corporate philanthropy literature and research on executive organizational identification by highlighting the importance of executive roles and their interactions.

This study extends the extant literature on corporate philanthropy by exploring the indirect effect of physical attractiveness of CEOs on corporate philanthropy under conditional effects of family ownership and control. Recent empirical studies in psychology suggest that egalitarian values are negatively related to physical attractiveness. Based on these findings, we propose that physically attractive CEOs invest less in corporate philanthropic activities than less attractive peers as they have lower egalitarian values. Leveraging upper echelons and stewardship theory, we further consider the moderating impact of family ownership and control on the indirect relationship between the physical attractiveness of a CEO and philanthropy mediated through egalitarianism.

This study examines corporate philanthropy in the context of corporate wrongdoing punishment in emerging markets. Building on institutional theory, we propose that in emerging markets, after being punished for fraudulent behavior by the government, which is collectively the largest institution, convicted firms tend to use corporate philanthropy as an institutional strategy to regain legitimacy. Using data of Chinese-listed firms that were punished for financial fraud in the ten years from 2004 to 2013, our findings show the subsequent growth of corporate philanthropy to be positively related to punishment severity. Furthermore, convicted firms’ media visibility, dominant state ownership, and national political appointment strengthen the effect of punishment severity on corporate philanthropy increase. Our institutional perspective offers new insights into why firms engage in corporate philanthropy after fraud punishment.