As a wide-reaching institutional reform, China's fiscal decentralization was launched in the early 1980s to encourage provincial economic growth by granting more financial autonomy to provincial governments. In this paper, the impact of fiscal decentralization on China's environmental quality is investigated both theoretically and empirically. A neoclassical model is developed based on the primary characteristics of China's fiscal decentralization. Using provincial panel data for the period 1995-2015, a two-equation regression model is employed to empirically verify the three propositions of the theoretical model: (1) there exists an inverted-U shaped relationship between fiscal decentralization and GDP per capita; (2) fiscal decentralization is positively related to GDP per capita at the steady state; (3) there is an inverted-U shaped Environmental Kuznets Curve relationship between pollution emissions and economic growth.

Inter-jurisdictional water resource issues constitute a growing political and economic challenge in China. This article examines three such cases of hydropolitics, namely large dam construction, water resource allocation, and downstream water pollution, through the lens of central–local relations. It argues that the hydropolitics in China are characterized by the pursuit of localized preferences within the constraints imposed by a centralized political system. In each case, the primary actors are sub-national administrative units, who adopt various competitive strategies to pursue their own localized interests at the expense of neighbouring jurisdictions. This article argues that although vertical control mechanisms in the Chinese system effectively limit central–local preference divergence, they do little to contain horizontal conflicts between sub-national administrative units. The paucity of formal inter-jurisdictional dispute resolution mechanisms is a major barrier to meeting water resource challenges, and inter-jurisdictional collective action problems are likely to pose growing difficulties for the Chinese political system.

This article examines local fiscal behavior in contemporary China against the backdrop of decentralized spending responsibilities and recentralized revenues. Vertical imbalance after the 1994 tax-sharing system reform, coupled with other features of the fiscal institutions, is not conducive to conservative local fiscal behavior. Moreover, a main driving force behind the expansion of local governments is the politically motivated intergovernmental transfer scheme. The center in effect “buys” political stability in sensitive areas while holding local leaders accountable for their tax efforts. A dynamic panel analysis of Chinese counties reveals that a million-yuan increase in general transfer payment and salary raise subsidies would add, respectively, fifteen and sixteen employees to the county government payroll, other things being equal. At the same time, increased subsidies from upper-level governments do not “crowd out” or significantly affect local tax effort. Additional dynamic panel data analysis at the provincial level produced similar findings.