In six studies, we find evidence for an upward mobility bias, or a tendency to predict that a rise in ranking is more likely than a decline, even in domains where motivation or intention to rise play no role. Although people cannot willfully change their height (Study 1), and geographical entities cannot willfully alter their temperature (Study 2), number of natural disasters (Study 3), levels of precipitation (Studies 4A and 4B), or chemical concentration (Study 5), subjects believed that each is more likely to rise than drop in ranking. This bias is due to an association between a ranking’s order and the direction of absolute change, and to the tendency to give considerable weight to a focal agent over non-focal agents. Because people generally expect change to be represented in terms of higher ranks, and because they tend to focus on specific, focal targets, they believe that any given target will experience a larger relative increase than other targets. We discuss implications for social policy.

People overestimate their affective reactions to future events and decisions — a phenomenon that has been termed “impact bias.” Evidence suggests that completing a diary detailing events contemporaneous with the focal one de-biases judgments of affect. It is generally assumed that this is because diary completion helps people to realize that they will be distracted from the focal event. However, there is another possibility: de-biasing may occur because diary completion interferes with the processing responsible for the bias. In a first experiment, we showed that diary completion also lowers affect associated with past decisions. In a second experiment, we showed that solving anagrams has the same effect. A third experiment demonstrates that this is not because affect judgments are influenced by mood changes brought about by solving anagrams. Indeed, monitoring moods lowered affect in the same way as diary completion. It appears that cognitive tasks of any sort interfere with the processing required by judgments of affect.

Often to the detriment of human decision making, people are prone to an impact bias when making affective forecasts, overestimating the emotional consequences of future events. The cognitive processes underlying the impact bias, and methods for correcting it, have been debated and warrant further exploration. In the present investigation, we examined both individual differences and contextual variables associated with cognitive processing in affective forecasting for an election. Results showed that the perceived importance of the event and working memory capacity were both associated with an increased impact bias for some participants, whereas retrieval interference had no relationship with bias. Additionally, an experimental manipulation effectively reduced biased forecasts, particularly among participants who were most distracted thinking about peripheral life events. These findings have theoretical implications for understanding the impact bias, highlight the importance of individual differences in affective forecasting, and have ramifications for future decision making research. The possible functional role of the impact bias is discussed within the context of evolutionary psychology.