There are thousands of families of missing persons around the world who search for answers as to the fate and whereabouts of their loved ones, hoping to be reunited with them, or in the event that they are deceased, to be able to mourn and grieve their death with dignity. In practice when authorities speak with families to confirm that the missing person is deceased, two initial questions frequently arise. First, families generally want to know, “did you identify the body of my relative?” The second question, once they receive information that their loved one has been positively identified as deceased, is usually, “how did they die?” This article examines whether international humanitarian law requires providing families of the missing, who may know or believe that their relative is deceased, with an answer to this second question of “how did they die?” The article argues that under certain circumstances, it is a requirement of international humanitarian law to provide some information about the cause, manner and circumstances of death to families. It also argues that the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement can strengthen the rights of families of the missing by engaging confidentially (directly or indirectly) with judicial bodies that are charged with both identification of the missing and accountability for violations of international humanitarian law. While this is challenging, it is argued that it is often possible to do so while respecting and adhering to the fundamental principles of the Movement, and, in turn, advancing the fundamental principle of humanity.

We investigated age estimation of persons using 45 Japanese human teeth that consisted of mainly the third molar. We measured the radiocarbon content in tooth enamel hydroxyapatite from the crown as well as those in collagen and bioapatite in the root of the same tooth. Age estimations from tooth enamel apatite yielded an absolute age shift of 1.7±1.4 yr from the true age. This value suggests that estimating the age of Japanese people from tooth enamel is as accurate as the previous studies conducted in Europe and the USA. The 14C analysis of roots suggested that bioapatite is formed slightly later than collagen in the same tooth roots. The appropriate formation age ranges suggested by the tooth enamel analysis can be optimized and confirmed by using the additional F14C values of the root samples. We also noticed a characteristic trend of enamel δ13C values in comparison with the formation ages of the crowns of the teeth. The δ13C value tends to increase gradually from –13.0‰ to –11.5‰ from the 1960s to the 1970s, probably being caused by changes in the Japanese diet. This trend may support the selection of proper tooth formation age as supplemental data in addition to 14C content analyses.

This interview discusses the comparison that Klejn draws between archaeology and forensic science. This is a comparison that has been made many times previously by many different archaeologists (and crime writers), but Klejn is unusual in that he explores the implications of their similarity. In his view it is archaeology rather than history that is most closely related to forensic science. The difference between archaeology and history is important because when this difference was ignored, in the Soviet Union, it was to the detriment of both disciplines. Hence Klejn's continued concern – that the difference between archaeology and history is still, to some extent, ignored. Other subjects discussed include Klejn's view of the role of theory in relation to practice, his criticisms of New Archaeology and postprocessual archaeology, typology, the underlying principles of archaeology, ethnogenesis and the history of archaeology. Of course, in an interview of this length not all of these subjects are covered in great depth but it is hoped that enough is said that the reader may appreciate something of the nature and originality of Klejn's views.

Persistence of gunshot residue (GSR) simultaneously collected from hands, face and hair, and clothing of the shooting person was examined. Samples were collected from five shooters in nine time intervals after a single shoot with a Luger 9 mm pistol, in the range of 0–4 h and examined with scanning electron microscopy and energy dispersive X-ray spectrometry. Numbers of particles, frequencies of occurrence of certain compositions of particles, and their sizes in function of the time intervals were inspected. The greatest numbers of particles were observed in samples collected from hands right after shooting, but they decrease quickly with time. In samples collected from the face smaller initial numbers of particles were found, but they lasted at a similar level longer. The estimated half-life times of particles were less than 1 h for samples taken from the hands, over 1 h for clothing and about 2–3 h for the face. In samples collected at longer intervals after shooting, there were particles present of small sizes and irregular shapes. The results demonstrate that including evidence collected from the suspect's face and hair may increase the probability of detection of GSR in cases when the suspect has not been apprehended immediately after the investigated incident.

This article explores the FBI's early efforts to develop and implement a standardized DNA profiling regime in a legal and scientific landscape shaped by strong defense challenges to the technique. Although the FBI claimed numerous times that its standardization efforts were purely ‘technical’, the FBI knew it had to create a social infrastructure that would serve to ensure the validity and reliability of the forensic DNA evidence. At the center of the system would be the FBI, serving as the obligatory, if reluctant, passage point for both technical and social exchanges. The FBI decided largely by fiat that forensic scientists based in public crime laboratories, but with little molecular biology and genetics training, bore the primary responsibility for setting standards, as well as carrying out, forensic DNA analysis. At the same time, the FBI actively excluded representatives from the private biotechnology companies that introduced the technique into the legal system, as well as the members of the defense community that were responsible for highlighting potential problems with the technique in court.