Because economic outcomes depend on private-sector expectations, central banks might be tempted to guide these by publishing projections of key macroeconomic variables. We find that optimal projections require misleading the public. Optimal non-misleading projections are time-inconsistent. Non-misleading time-consistent projections can only improve policy outcomes if the public’s forecasts are noisier, or inconsistent with implemented policy. Since the public only has incentives to be guided by policymakers’ projections when most vulnerable to being mislead, these cannot be trusted blindly. Consistent with this, we find statistically significant systematic deviations between FOMC projections and professional forecasts for US inflation and GDP growth.

This paper examines the effectiveness of forward guidance shocks in the US. We estimate a New Keynesian model with imperfect central bank credibility and heterogeneous expectations using Bayesian methods and survey data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The results provide important takeaways: (1) The estimated credibility of the Fed’s forward guidance announcements is relatively high, but anticipation effects are attenuated. Accordingly, output and inflation do not respond as favorably as in the fully credible counterfactual. (2) The so-called “forward guidance puzzle” arises partly from the unrealistically large responses of macroeconomic variables to forward guidance under perfect credibility and homogeneous fully informed rational expectations, assumptions which are found to be jointly inconsistent with the observed US data. (3) Imperfect credibility provides a plausible explanation for the empirical evidence of forecasting error predictability based on forecasting disagreement found in the SPF data. Thus, we show that accounting for imperfect credibility and forecasting disagreements is important to understand the formation of expectations and the transmission mechanism of forward guidance.

Why is a zero lower bound episode long-lasting and disruptive? This paper proposes the interruption of information flow from the central bank’s interest rate decision to the private sector as a channel by which the destabilizing effect of the zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate is amplified. This mechanism is incorporated into the new Keynesian model by modifying its information structure. This paper shows that the information loss at the zero lower bound can increase (a) the duration of the zero lower bound episodes and (b) the size of deflation and output gap loss. The result in this paper demonstrates that enhanced information sharing by the central bank about the state of the economy can be effective at alleviating the cost of the zero lower bound.

We examine “Forward Guidance Contracts,” which penalize central bankers for choosing high interest rates. We integrate those contracts into the New Keynesian Framework and show that they can be used to overcome a liquidity trap. Moreover, although the government takes only a share of the social benefits into account when it has to decide whether to offer the contract, we demonstrate that for plausible parameter values the government will always find it desirable to offer the contract in a liquidity trap but not in normal times. Finally, we show that the optimal duration of such contracts is typically very short.