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  • 10 - Courts as Constitutional Rule-Makers for Elections and Parties

  • from Part III - Specific Institutions
  • Edited by Tom Ginsburg, University of Chicago, Aziz Z. Huq, University of Chicago, Tarun Khaitan, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Book:
    The Entrenchment of Democracy
    Published online:
    16 December 2024
    Print publication:
    05 December 2024, pp 188-205
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  • Summary

    This chapter maps the effects and implications of a judicial presence in the constitutional law of parties and elections. It first aims to clarify some theoretical premises of this constitutional design choice raised by a potential judicial role in elections and party managements. It then develops an analytic taxonomy of potential judicial tasks in managing elections, offering numerous examples, with the general ambition of fostering democratic stability. This taxonomy of beneficial uses is complemented with an enumeration of potential risks. This theoretical and analytic work counsels against simple and unidirectional prescriptions about the role of courts in protecting democracies, although it does clarify the stakes of their role, and their comparative advantages (and disadvantages) in relation to fourth-branch bodies.