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This chapter reflects on the book’s findings and elucidates three major factors behind Turkey’s intra–alliance opposition behavior: 1) international systemic and regional sub–systemic factors; 2) irreconcilable interests due to lack of progress in its EU accession talks, US support for Syrian Kurds at the expense of Turkey’s key interests in the Middle East, the unresolved Cyprus problem, Turkey’s resentment for its exclusion from European and Middle Eastern security developments by its transatlantic partners, causing biases and mistrust in Turkey’s relations with the EU, the USA, and NATO; and 3) domestic factors. It then explores three potential scenarios on the future of Turkey’s relations with the West and argues that the factors outlined here provoke unease and reinforce ambitions on the part of Turkey to provide a hedge against the West. It places the book’s findings in a larger context of intra–alliance opposition/conflict and discusses the implications of its findings for the IR literature. It argues that Turkish hard balancing is on the horizon and concludes by making recommendations for engaging Turkey in a mutually beneficial way.
This timely book fills an important gap in the literature of international relations, providing a thorough, up-to-date, empirically supported, and theoretically grounded analysis of how and why Turkish foreign policy has changed in recent years vis-à-vis the West. Presenting one of the first balancing studies that employs elite interviews as data, Turkey–West Relations develops a framework of intra-alliance opposition, classifying the tools of statecraft into three categories - boundary testing, boundary challenging, and boundary breaking. Six case studies are examined regarding Turkish foreign policy over the past nine years, exploring an array of topics including Turkey's foreign policy in relation to various nations and organizations, the refugee crisis, defense procurement, energy policies, and more. Dursun-Özkanca demonstrates how international, regional, issue-specific, and domestic factors may serve to explain Turkey's increasing boundary-breaking behavior. This book is crucial for anyone who seeks to understand the recent growing rifts between Turkey and the US, the EU, and NATO.
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