The Consolation defends many claims about human nature and personhood, and depicts an exemplary human person, Boethius the character. This chapter synthesizes the book’s often puzzling and apparently divergent claims, while illustrating them with the depiction of the character of Boethius. It begins by outlining Boethius’ account of human powers and human nature, and then considers the Consolation’s account of human personhood. While Boethius’ account of personhood in the Consolation lacks the technical precision found in his Trinitarian works, he does give an account of some fundamental characteristics of persons consonant with his more explicit treatment in other texts. Finally, the chapter considers three distinctive themes in the Consolation’s account of human persons. First, this text controversially depicts human nature as able to change into that of a god or of a beast. Second, the Consolation depicts all human persons as microcosms, including within ourselves all aspects of the cosmos. Third, Boethius, like many classical writers, depicts human persons as most understandable in relation to beauty. Since this theme sums up earlier ones, the chapter closes there.

This introductory chapter identifies the key questions, themes and debates addressed within the Handbook on Natural Law and Human Rights, and provides a conceptual overview of and integrated perspective on its contents. In particular, it argues that there is a perennial relationship between human rights and the phenomenon of natural law, which is revealed when we consider how human rights claims can justify the moral demands made on other agents and on the political community. Without prior moral duties – a natural law – human rights claims are impugned by the ‘individualist fallacy’, whereby the potential value of the right to the claimant is presumed sufficient to impose overriding duties, without due consideration being paid to the constitutive social commitments necessary to make that value a matter of common concern and action. The failure to come to grips with this problem, we argue, has led to certain blindspots in contemporary human rights theory and practice. This chapter draws to a close by identifying the key benefits we see accruing from a natural law theory of human rights.

This chapter examined the foundations of Judge John T. Noonan Jr.’s personalist jurisprudence. It looks first at some principal sources for his work, in particular Étienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain. It then engages in a close analysis of Noonan’s book, Persons and Masks of the Law, reflecting on the ways in which Noonan insists that while rules matter in the legal process, rules depend for their efficacy on the persons applying, complying, and evaluating those rules. The chapter then shifts its focus to consider two further aspects of Noonan’s thought: the centrality of narrative and love to the operation of the law. We are defined by narrative, Noonan demonstrates. This is so for us as individuals and as communities. Thus the legal process can only be understood through story. And we must relate to one another in love. This is true as much for individuals responding to the needs of others as it is for lawyers and judges seeking to interpret the words of contracts or wills.