This article presents three arguments on why businesses have direct obligations under existing international law. Nevertheless, in the present state of international law, the obligations of businesses are limited and wholly dependent on the state’s further action of implementation and enforcement. To reach this conclusion, the article asserts that businesses have partial legal personality in international law; that legal obligations and the enforcement model must be distinguished as two separate issues; and that human rights are requirements of justice that emanate from the dignity of each human person to any social actor, including businesses and other non-state actors. The article attempts to contribute to the debate about a binding instrument on business and human rights and presents an alternative understanding of international law that can assist domestic tribunals in applying international human rights standards to businesses as they carry out activities in their jurisdictions.

Human rights have come to play a prominent role in debates about the responsibilities of business. In the business ethics literature, there are two approaches to the question of whether businesses have human rights obligations. The ‘moral’ approach conceives of human rights as antecedently existing basic moral rights. The ‘institutional’ approach starts with contemporary human rights practice in which human rights refer to rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent international documents, and in which states are the primary duty bearers of human rights. This commentary argues that the implications of adopting one or the other approach are much greater than most scholars recognize, and that we have reason to reject the moral approach and to adopt the institutional approach instead. The commentary highlights key questions that need to be addressed if human rights are to play a central role in framing the responsibilities of business.

The claim that corporations have human rights obligations remains contentious and can be fraught with confusion. This article synthesizes existing corporate human rights theory and responds to objections to the idea that transnational corporations (TNCs) have human rights obligations. The argument proceeds in three stages. The first section describes the different forms TNCs take and explains why TNCs are properly understood as moral agents responsible for their policies and practices. The second section reviews and explains different philosophical theories of corporate human rights obligations. The third section articulates and responds to objections to the idea that corporations have human rights obligations. The main conclusion of this article is that there are multiple, compelling and overlapping justifications of corporate human rights obligations.

This article examines the applicability of international human rights law in situations of military occupation. Proceeding from the position that human rights obligations can exist in these circumstances, the article provides an analysis of the precise modalities of application. It examines the tests for the determination of human rights applicability, and how these are linked to the concept of occupation. Finally, it recognizes the practical and legal challenges to the implementation of human rights obligations, and argues for a contextual approach that provides for human rights protection while recognizing the realities of military occupation.

UN human rights binding on states; binding on UN organs? – Sanctions mechanism as implemented in EU – Kadi and others – Ruling Court of First Instance – Relation between UN law and EC law – Human rights obligations – Exception, political question, etc. – Solange – Monism and dualism – Questions remain