In Lyman v. Huber, a woman who had endured decades of emotional abuse from her domestic partner was awarded damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) by the trial court, but the appellate court reversed, concluding that while she actually did suffer severe distress, a reasonable person would not have suffered. The rewritten feminist opinion upholds the trial verdict, pointing out that the legal requirement that an IIED victim’s suffering should be measured against an objective “reasonable person” standard is contrary to normal tort principles that compensate for the harm actually incurred. It argues that IIED law should be changed to permit recovery for harm actually caused, rather than “reasonably” experienced, and demonstrates implicit gender bias in the “reasonable person” standard. The accompanying commentary discusses how courts, as exemplified by this case, have erected heightened IIED standards for domestic abuse victims that have made it far more difficult for them to recover damages.

Robinson v. Cutchin involved the nonconsensual sterilization of an African-American woman because the doctor thought that she had enough children. Although unconsented to medical treatment presents a traditional tort claim for battery, the trial judge dismissed this claim because he considered the sterilization neither physically harmful nor offensive. The rewritten feminist opinion draws on the history of involuntary sterilization of women of color to conclude that such conduct is inherently outrageous and causes serious physical and emotional harm, and thus should be redressed as both a battery and as intentional infliction of emotional distress, with punitive damages. The feminist opinion highlights the ways the actual judgment distorts both the law and the reality of women’s experience of harm. The accompanying commentary situates this case in the history of racially based involuntary sterilization and both medical and judicial dismissiveness of the seriousness of the harm, and thus sheds light on how tort law has failed to deter this abusive practice.

Guthrie v. Conway exemplifies the reluctance of many courts to allow victims of workplace sexual harassment to sue in tort for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The employer in Guthrie escaped liability because the court did not regard numerous incidents of harassment as sufficiently “outrageous” conduct to justify tort recovery. The rewritten feminist dissent explains how courts often misuse summary judgment in hostile workplace environment cases and argues for a contextual application of the elements of IIED based on the victims’ experience. The feminist dissent would allow a jury to review the evidence in its totality, would not require the harassment to be overtly sexual to qualify as outrageous conduct, and would permit a tort claim regardless of whether the victim also had a viable claim under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The accompanying commentary catalogues the various techniques courts have used to exclude feminist perspectives in harassment cases and urges a greater role for tort litigation.

Boyles v. Kerr exemplifies judicial reluctance to permit tort claims for negligently inflicted emotional harm. Severely curtailing prior cases that permitted claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), the Texas Supreme Court rejected the claim for a woman whose sexual partner surreptitiously videotaped their intercourse and displayed the tape at college parties. The feminist rewritten opinion reverses this ruling, making the NIED claim fully available to the victim of revenge porn. It demonstrates gender bias in the court’s conflicting precedents, which approved NIED claims for women comporting with traditional notions of femininity, while denying the claim for the sexually liberated plaintiff. It powerfully asserts the value and dignity of all women and the importance of tort law in deterring callous male behavior that objectifies women. The accompanying commentary situates the case in the development of NIED law and highlights how NIED law is permeated with gender stereotypes.