Many multilateral environmental treaties have established committees that monitor compliance and/or facilitate implementation. These committees can be triggered in a number of ways, e.g., when a State party seizes the committee concerning another State party’s compliance or implementation. This type of trigger resembles the most traditional judicial proceedings, as it opposes two States, and has the potential to lead to decisions of non-compliance. It is perceived to be more confrontational than facilitative. State-to-State triggers therefore sit in between judicial and non-judicial procedures, and between facilitation on the one hand and enforcement on the other. State-to-State triggers have only been used a handful of times. This chapter explores why such triggers have been sparsely used. It first explains how State-to-State triggers were established and describes the instacnes in which they have been used. It then identifies and discusses two main challenges faced by State-to-State triggers: challenges related to the perception and behaviour of States vis-à-vis such triggers, and challenges related to institutional design and procedural mechanisms of State-to-State procedures.

This chapter addresses, as a first component of the proposed framework, the first constituent expectation of trust in the citizen-government relationship: goodwill. It defines the expectation as consisting of two sub-expectations: an expectation of procedural fairness – which includes elements of transparency, citizen participation and respect for citizens’ right to equality – and an ‘expectation of good intentions’, which translates into an expectation that the elected branches’ staff will not act intransigently in exercising their control over social goods and services. The chapter also details how the courts can enforce the expectation. It explains that for this component, the courts, first, demand a fair decision-making procedure from the elected branches, and, secondly, respond to government intransigence by escalating to progressively less trusting judicial interventions. The chapter uses cases from various jurisdictions, including Canada, Colombia, Germany, Kenya, South Africa and the UK, to illustrate.

In preparation for Chapters 5–7 – which detail the three components of the proposed trust-based framework – this chapter addresses three issues. With reference to the social rights literature, it first substantiates the conclusion that social rights are justiciable, justifying the need for an enforcement framework to be used by the courts. Secondly, the chapter describes how the courts can use the concept of political trust as the basis for a social rights enforcement framework. It explains that under the trust-based framework, the courts promote the elected branches’ trustworthiness with respect to social rights. The courts specifically hold the elected branches to a ‘standard of trustworthiness’, effectively enforcing the three constituent expectations of trust in the citizen-government relationship – goodwill, competence and fiduciary responsibility. Lastly, the chapter outlines four justifications – theoretical, instrumental, practical and democratic – for why political trust should provide the basis for a social rights enforcement framework.

This chapter addresses, as a third component of the proposed framework, the third constituent expectation of trust in the citizen-government relationship: fiduciary responsibility. Employing scholarship on both private fiduciary law and fiduciary political theory, it defines the expectation as an expectation that the elected branches will fulfil their fiduciary duty of loyalty to citizens. This duty translates, the chapter argues, into an expectation of non-corruption from the elected branches’ staff. The chapter also details how the courts can enforce the expectation. It explains that for this component, the courts aim to curb corrupt practices from the elected branches’ staff, and it identifies steps the courts can take to do so: greater probing into the state’s financial resources; strictly enforcing public procurement law; holding non-state actors accountable to the public; involving specialised anti-corruption agencies; and imposing financial sanctions on government actors. The chapter illustrates these steps using cases from various jurisdictions, including South Africa, Uganda and the UK.

This chapter introduces the book. It expresses as the book’s principal objective the advancement of a normative argument regarding the judicial enforcement of constitutional social rights. This argument is that the courts, when enforcing these rights against government actors, should focus their analysis on public trust in government or ‘political trust’ – with the book’s proposed trust-based framework following on from this argument. As a starting point for this normative argument, and to address the broader question of why we should examine social rights law from the perspective of political trust, the chapter considers the relationship between political trust and public cooperation. Additionally, the chapter covers preliminary matters, defining the book’s scope, delineating the applicability of the trust-based framework, situating the framework in existing frameworks for social rights enforcement and outlining the book’s structure.

This chapter concludes the book. It stresses that with the global rise of constitutionalised and justiciable social rights, and the corresponding proliferation of social rights litigation, courts require guidance on how to enforce these rights. It summarises the proposed trust-based framework and how it addresses the drawbacks of existing frameworks for social rights enforcement. The chapter also discusses the framework’s implications, noting that the framework is not limited per se to social rights enforcement but may be applied, with appropriate modifications, to other areas of human rights law.

This chapter addresses, as a second component of the proposed framework, the second constituent expectation of trust in the citizen-government relationship: competence. It defines the expectation as an expectation of evidence-based policy-making (EBPM) from the elected branches in their exercise of control over social goods and services. Drawing on scholarship on EBPM, it argues that EBPM consists of three forms of knowledge: knowledge from scientific research, ‘political knowledge’ and ‘practical implementation knowledge’. The chapter also details how the courts can enforce the expectation. It explains that for this component, the courts incorporate EBPM into social rights enforcement. More specifically, the courts require the elected branches to provide evidence demonstrating that their decision-making vis-a-vis social goods and services is evidence based. The chapter offers illustrations from various jurisdictions, including Germany, South Africa, the UK and Latvia.