We show that, in the large-firm search model, employment may decrease even when the level of the introduced minimum wage lies below the equilibrium wage of the laissez-faire economy. Wages also decrease in the presence of the minimum wage. The argument is based on multiple equilibria and the idea that, in a large-firm context, the representative firm may choose to overemploy workers in order to renegotiate lower wages.

This study presents the first results of an on-going study of longevity of large Spanish family firms. Its main objective is to provide solid data for a topic in which opinions are more abundant than scientific statistics, as well as to identify the keys to the survival and competitiveness of the almost 250 firms included in the study. It concludes that this reality is not just the result of two decades of integration in Europe or a fortunate endowment with some natural resources, but the outcome of a long learning process and the combination of two factors: specialization in market niches in which the state had no strategic interests and the creation of personal networks of cooperation and influence within and outside Spain.

We analyze the role of intrafirm bargaining in the large-firm matching model and underline the conditions under which the Pissarides equivalence between this model and the “single-worker” firm's model holds.