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1 results

  • 7 - Proxy Advisors

  • from Part I - What Do We Know about Corporate Governance Practices?
  • Bryce C. Tingle, University of Calgary
  • Book:
    Hard Lessons in Corporate Governance
    Published online:
    23 May 2024
    Print publication:
    30 May 2024, pp 143-166

  • Summary

    This chapter looks at the rise of proxy advisors and their influence over corporate governance arrangements. It examines the evidence that proxy advisors: (1) create deeply flawed voting guidelines; (2) promote governance practices that are ineffective or produce adverse corporate outcomes; (3) base their advice on assumptions that do not hold up under scrutiny; (4) adopt voting policies that necessarily occasionally generate perverse outcomes; (5) make mistakes; (6) refuse to correct mistakes; (7) cause their clients to vote in ways that contradict those clients’ own opinions; and (8) are not held accountable by their institutional shareholder clients.