If West Germany had one unique asset, it was the bedrock stability of its currency, the Deutsche Mark. Chapter 4 introduces the principal defenders of German stability – the economy and finance ministries, the Bundesbank, and the Council of Economic Experts. In fall 1965, Chancellor Erhard identified the maintenance of price stability as the foundation of German policy – with enormous repercussions for foreign relations. In 1965-66, development aid programs, restitution to Israel, and offset purchases from the United States would all be scaled back in order to keep Bonn’s budget balanced and avoid stimulating inflation. German monetary experts worked closely with U.S. officials to uphold the Bretton Woods monetary system; but Lyndon Johnson was furious that Erhard had broken his offset pledges, particularly since West Germany remained reluctant to send personnel to Vietnam. In spring 1966, Erhard’s cabinet tried to unthaw relations with the USSR by issuing a “peace note” calling for mutual renunciation-of-force declarations; but the Soviet bloc rejected the approach as inadequate. When West Germany slipped into recession, Erhard’s coalition collapsed in failure.

With the forming of a Grand Coalition, headed by Kurt Kiesinger (CDU/CSU) as chancellor and Willy Brandt (SPD) as foreign minister, West Germany sought equidistance between France and the United States and pursued a new Ostpolitik in parallel with de Gaulle. As Chapter 5 explains, the project proved highly unstable; de Gaulle could do little to aid Bonn vis-à-vis Poland, and Brandt wound up preferring direct contacts with the Soviets. Disputes over Britain’s accession to the EEC further soured Franco-German relations, and Paris was hardly pleased at Bonn’s renewal of its offset promises toward London and Washington. But the U.S.–German relationship also came under strain as the United States and USSR negotiated a non-proliferation treaty (NPT) that would force West Germany to accept a permanently inferior status. Kiesinger and Brandt used their leverage with Washington to force significant changes to the NPT in the areas of nuclear research and commerce; but they also consulted with other nuclear have-nots, such as India and Iran, and contemplated Germany’s future as a middle-sized power. Increasingly, West Germans identified technology exports as a significant source of prestige.

Chapter 2 outlines Ludwig Erhard’s efforts to position West Germany as a Cold War partner to the United States, as pledged during a visit to Lyndon Johnson’s ranch in December 1963. Defense minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel strongly advocated German participation in a NATO multilateral nuclear force (MLF); and he and Erhard signed off on a $1.35 billion offset agreement calling for massive purchases of U.S. weapons. They also agreed to a secret scheme to funnel surplus U.S.-built M-48 tanks to Israel. The Bundestag refused to sanction German deployments overseas, however – whether peacekeeping in Cyprus or a field hospital to Vietnam. “Gaullists” within Erhard’s CDU/CSU party, notably Franz Josef Strauss, complained about Erhard’s neglect of France, and his decision to placate Johnson by refusing a trade mission to China. Motion toward German unity remained stalled; Erhard’s idea of “buying off” the USSR with massive economic aid went nowhere, as did Gerhard Schröder’s policy of “small steps” toward the East. A holiday pass arrangement allowing visits across the Berlin Wall, arranged by Mayor Willy Brandt, offered the strongest evidence for Germans’ sense of belonging together.

This chapter focuses on the voluntary carbon markets by providing an overview of the Clean Development Mechanism and the Verified Carbon Standard. It uses examples from the private sector to showcase the use of DLT in the voluntary carbon markets.

This chapter provides a background to and analysis of REDD+ from multiple angles and across a number of different registers. Firstly, it traces the history of REDD+ as a legal agreement that provides the framework through which activities to address deforestation and forest degradation can be measured, reported and verified as ‘result-based action’ and made legible in the rubric of one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent. Secondly, this chapter examines REDD+ as constituted through experimental practices, preparatory and market-construction activities. Thirdly, it analyses REDD+ as a concept or idea arising from the field of environmental economics, namely, that forest protection can be ‘incentivised’ through the financial valuation of nature and payment for environmental services schemes, including potentially the inclusion of forests in international carbon markets. Fourthly, it provides an overview of the activities that are promoted through REDD+ and interrogates the history of both conservation and sustainable forest management. Finally, it outlines how the scope of REDD+ programmes and projects has extended beyond its initial environmental focus, so that REDD+ has now also become a social project concerned with ‘co-benefits’ such as poverty alleviation, tenure reform and rights for people living in and around forested areas.

Chapter 7 identifies a conundrum of the EITC: It is intended to lift low-income individuals out of poverty, yet the credit is subject to capture by a number of creditors and agencies. Because it is delivered as a tax refund, the amount due to the taxpayer can be offset against outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, past-due child support, and federal student loan liabilities. The possibility of such offset betrays its function as an antipoverty supplement. Low-income families are subject to various economic stressors and are likely to have outstanding debts. In reconfiguring the credit into two distinct elements – an incentive to work and an antipoverty supplement – Congress might consider whether the latter should be protected from offset or garnishment (in whole or in part) in order to better serve its purpose. This chapter considers the pros and cons of such a protection, and proposes some possible structures.