Scholarship on De Officiis tends to place the emphasis on those aspects of the treatise that outline the building blocks of a functioning commonwealth. What tends to receive rather less attention is Cicero’s theorizing of what to do in situations of communal breakdown. But in De Officiis he is as interested in injustice as he is in justice, in the ability of humans to inflict massive damage on each other, in the insufficiency of legislation to ensure harmonious co-existence, in fraud and abuse of power. To address the problem of harm and injustice Cicero calls for vigilance and intervention on the part of all members of the community and endorses ‘protective violence’ up to and including the license, indeed the duty, to kill tyrannical figures that threaten the fabric of communal life. This chapter argues that Cicero’s ethical extremism animates the entire treatise. To render this claim plausible it explores the historical circumstances that gave rise to it and traces its ubiquitous presence within De Officiis, with a particular focus on the conceptual strategies used to justify murder.

In book 1.11-20 of De Officiis, Cicero draws on the work of Panaetius to give an account of how the most basic, in-built features of human nature provide a foundation for the cardinal virtues. His account begins from the basic drive for self-preservation which is the usual starting point for the canonical Stoic doctrine of oikeiōsis. The developments that Cicero claims follow from this fundamental starting point are, however, quite different from those which ensue on the other preserved accounts of oikeiōsis, such as that reported for Chrysippus in Diogenes Laërtius 7.85-86, the account in Cicero’s De Finibus 3.16-25 and the one in letter 121 of Seneca. It is also importantly different from the more complex account attributed to Posidonius by Galen in On the Doctrines of Plato and Hippocrates 5.5.8-9. By comparing and contrasting Cicero’s theory in the De Officiis with these other accounts, this chapter will explore important facets of Cicero’s philosophical method, his originality in adapting Panaetius’ theory to his own purposes, and the merits of the novel doctrine he embraced in his final philosophical work.

In De Officiis, Cicero values very highly the little society of parents and their children: an origin of society and seedbed of the republic, whose members should rank extraordinarily high among each other’s priorities. In light of Cicero’s biography and longstanding interest in a philosophical debate about parental love, I argue that Cicero’s position is that nature gives to humans a non-rational desire to care for their children, which leads many parents to rational love of their children, whereby they care about what is natural for at least some other humans, their children, as they care about it for themselves, holding property in common within the household. The rest of the family thereby learn loving attitudes. Such parents and their home are for their children images, however flawed, of virtue and a virtuous society. By making this experience common, nature teaches a lesson in what virtuous altruists would be like.