This chapter departs from the classic definition of parties and applies a novel theory that casts doubt on the validity of the minimalist definition using two Costa Rican cases. Discussion of horizontal and vertical mechanisms as applied to the National Liberation Party (PLN) and Citizens Action Party (PAC) reveals strong similarities in terms of party organizations and challenges for policy consistency at the local level combined with marked contrasts in their capacities to process collective demands. The main finding of this chapter is that the PLN and PAC, two of the most prominent parties in the country, are quite different one from another. Regardless of their remarkable differences, both parties share the feature of having evolving constituencies, though their respective constituencies are evolving in opposite directions. The PLN fits the classic definition of a party with a well-organized and fully developed constituency suffering from decreasing membership over the last two decades. The PAC, on the other hand, does not have a sufficiently developed constituency to be considered a fully functioning party. The PAC does, however, have activists and is developing its membership.

The Paraguayan party system, centered on two 132-year-old parties seemingly poised to remain alive and well for years to come, constitutes an anomaly in Latin America. This chapter discusses the evolution of the Paraguayan traditional parties highlighting their changes and continuities in two different historical settings: the nondemocratic period, which includes a semi-competitive (1870–1940) and a dictatorial subperiod (1954–89) and the post-1989 democratic period. The findings point to three distinctive features of the Paraguayan party system: the ability of the traditional parties to plant deep roots into the country’s social structure facilitated by historic and institutional factors; the capacity of the parties to aggregate in a clientelist mode the interests of a population that lacks strong collective actors, made possible by a socioeconomic societal matrix; and the versatility with which parties have coordinated interests, both in semi-democratic as well as in democratic settings, which includes electoral mobilization but also civilian recruitment for armed uprisings. Finally, the chapter discusses possible future trends in light of the growing influence of illegal financing and recent changes to the rules governing elections mandating the system of “open lists.”

This final chapter of the edited volume summarizes each case study’s main contributions. It also provides comparative insights concerning the determinants of the presence or absence of a given type of electoral vehicle. Finally, the chapter discusses how the volume’s conceptual framework can advance our understanding of the processes of party building, institutionalization, decay, and collapse.

This chapter lays out the argument that Leninism, under the conditions of reform, decays in a predictable manner. With reform, the mass movements that had focused the attention of cadres ceased, thus causing them to pay less attention to instructions from above. The result was that networks – factions – formed at the local level. It became increasingly difficult for leaders in Beijing to control local cadres. The result was that local cadres formed groups that were interested first and foremost in their own political and material gains. Under Hu Jintao, these networks extended right into Zhongnanhai (the leadership compound in Beijing) and often took a predatory turn with regard to the people they governed. In an effort to break up local networks, Beijing began to experiment with local elections within the party. These elections were tightly controlled, but they nevertheless violated the central governing principle of Leninism, namely that the “party controls the cadres” – in other words that power must flow from the top down.